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Does the party thatprovides the first draft ofa merger agreement
get better terms as a result? There is considerable lore among
transactionallawyers on this question, yet it has never been examined
empirically. In this Article, we develop a novel dataset of drafting
practices in large M&A transactions involving US public-company
targets. First, we find that acquirersand sellers preparethefirst draft
ofthe merger agreementwith roughly equalfrequency, contrary to the
conventional wisdom that acquirers virtually always draft first.
Second, we find that providing the first draft offers little or no
advantage with regard to the most monetizable merger agreement
terms, such as merger breakupfees. Third, and notwithstanding, we
do find an association between drafting first and attaining a more
favorableoutcome for terms that are harderto monetize, thatare more
complex, and that tend to be negotiatedexclusively by counsel, such
as the material adverse change (MAC) clause. These findings are
consistent with the view that the negotiation process generates
frictions and agency costs, which can affect the final deal terms and
result in a limitedfirst-drafteradvantage.
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"Always grab the pen."
-M&A partner at top-5 US law firm (Nov. 3, 2017).
INTRODUCTION

Major corporate transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
and large debt or equity financings, involve big teams of lawyers commanding
2
premium billing rates.' The functions these lawyers serve are many and varied.
Among these, lawyers view preparing the first draft of the transaction agreement
as a critical component of the value they provide, devoting considerable time and
effort to it. In the drafting process, lawyers select the best precedent agreement

1. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death ofBig Law, 2010 WIs. L. REV. 749, 763 (2010).
2. For a review of the literature on the role of transactional lawyers, see Elisabeth de Fontenay,
Law Firm Selection and the Value of TransactionalLawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 398-404 (2015).
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form to start from and strategize how strongly to tilt the draft terms in their
client's favor. Indeed, it is an article of faith among lawyers that the first draft of
the agreement can influence the final deal reached: an advantage in the first stage
leads to an advantage for one's client in the end.3
This belief in the importance of providing the first draft extends to the most
elite law firms and their most sophisticated clients. For debt financing
transactions, for example, it has long been the unquestioned practice for lender's
counsel to draft all major financing documents. This is because the banks
involved are repeat players in these transactions and find it efficient to develop
their own forms.4 Yet sophisticated borrowers are now challenging this longestablished practice. The largest private equity firms currently represent a large
share of debt financing transactions on the borrower side. They are using their
bargaining power to wrest first-drafter rights from bank counsel. The result is
that banks such as JP Morgan and Citibank may be required to work from an
unfamiliar draft credit agreement provided by borrower's counsel, even when
underwriting and syndicating multibillion-dollar financing transactions. Why do
private equity firms find drafting rights so important that they are willing to
expend some of their capital vis-d-vis the banks to obtain them?
Relatedly, transactional lawyers also maintain that parties with superior
bargaining power tend to obtain better outcomes across the whole range of
transaction terms in an agreement.6 In other words, "leverage" over one's
counterparty in a transaction leads not only to more favorable deal pricing, but
also to many other more favorable terms.
Are these deeply held beliefs about a "first draft effect" or "bargaining
power effect" on deal terms correct? Many contract theorists would find them
implausible. For several decades now, a dominant view in the field of law and
3.
See Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manis, The Inefficient Evolution ofMergerAgreements, 85
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 66 (2017) ("Generally, lawyers believe that the ability to create the first draft
offers an advantage by giving lawyers the chance to choose the precedent and shape it to meet the needs
of the new deal."); see also ROBERT A. FELDMAN & RAYMOND T. NuVIMER, DRAFTING EFFECTIVE
CONTRACTS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (2d ed. 2005) 1-20 (cited in Anderson & Manns); JAMES C.
FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE

ACQUISITIONS 26-27 (1975) ("[T]he axiom is: if you have the opportunity to draft the documents, do
so.") (cited in Anderson & Manns).
4.

See PRACTICAL LAW FINANCE, SPONSOR/LENDER NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN ACQUISITION

FINANCE at 11 (2015), West Practical Law, Article 7-381-0292.
5. See id. (noting that this development defies the "customary procedure" of having lender's
counsel draft); Client Memorandum, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP,What a Difference a Year Makes: A
Review
of
Acquisition
Financing
in
2010,
at
1
(2011),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/files/Publication/79ac6695-c491-423e-b82e02e788176f51 /Preview/PublicationAttachment/fl5a07d3-9664-44fl-b8450493e0b07591/01251 1_acqjfinancing.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EU7-7CDT] (finding that "major [private
equity] sponsors are asking their counsel to produce the first draft of mandate papers").
6. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto
ManufacturingContracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 964 (2006) ("The lawyers and purchasing officials
who write and negotiate the supply contracts invest much effort in tightening up the legal terms and in
leveraging the OEMs' bargaining power in securing adherence to these terms.").
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economics has been that parties to any voluntary arrangement choose final
7
terms-other than the "price" term-that maximize their collective interests.
Further, the parties will arrive at these "efficient" terms regardless of their
relative bargaining power or the specifics of the negotiation process. One
implication is that who provides the first draft, and even what that first draft
contains, should be entirely irrelevant to the final contractual outcome. In this
view, the first draft of a transaction agreement is simply a default starting point
for negotiations: if the terms included in the first draft happen to be the efficient
ones, they will be retained; otherwise, they will be modified because both parties
8
have an interest in arriving at the efficient terms. For any given deal, if we
observe that most of the terms in the first draft have been retained in the final
agreement, that would simply indicate that the precedent form correctly
anticipated most of the efficient terms-as one might expect from a well-selected
precedent.
The prediction that the first drafter of a merger agreement will be irrelevant
to the terms of the final merger agreement therefore fits within the broader
literature on whether default terms matter in contractual relationships and other
voluntary arrangements. 9 Here, "default terms" are those that will apply to the
parties' relationship or transaction unless they are modified by mutual
agreement. There are other well-known contexts in which default terms may or
may not affect final outcomes, and the terms agreed to may or may not be
efficient. These include business organizational law, in which state statutes
provide certain default terms for each type of business entity, which the parties
are permitted to modify;'o commercial contracts governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code, which supplies default terms for such arrangements;" and
charter and by-law provisions at a corporation's initial public offering, which are
drafted unilaterally by the issuer's counsel, but may subsequently be modified if
12
the shareholders and board of directors so approve. In each case, scholars are

7. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of BargainingPower on ContractDesign,
98 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1667 (2012); see also infra note 29 and accompanying text.
8. For a comprehensive discussion of default rules in contract, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
FillingGaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
9. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 CHI. L. REV.
1416, 1444-45 (1989) (discussing the role of corporate law as a set of "off-the-rack" default rules that
minimize the transaction costs of negotiations); Yair Listokin, What Do CorporateDefault Rules and
Menus Do? An EmpiricalExamination, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 279, 280-81 (2009) (surveying
the theoretical literature on the use of default rules in voluntary arrangements).
10. See Bernard S. Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial?A Politicaland Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U.L. REV. 542, 592-93 (1990) (arguing that the default rules in corporate statutes do not influence
the ultimate bargain between shareholders and management). But see Listokin, supra note 9 at 306-08
(providing empirical evidence that default rules do affect such bargains).
11. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and ContractualConsent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 825 (1992) (noting that "many of the provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) are default rules, because they apply 'unless otherwise agreed').
12. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306 (1976) (arguing that
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divided as to whether the default terms actually influence the final terms, i.e.,
whether the parties retain them even when they are not efficient.13
If one believes that default terms in voluntary arrangements are largely
irrelevant, this should especially be the case for large mergers and acquisitions.
In these transactions, the parties are sophisticated, informed, and wealthy. The
negotiations are typically bilateral, and the transaction costs of negotiating, while
high in absolute terms, are low relative to the value of the deal. This is the setting
in which we explore the first-drafter advantage.1 4Although claims about a firstdrafter advantage on corporate transaction terms are ubiquitous among
practitioners, these claims have not been explored empirically. In fact, although
M&A transactions figure prominently in both the finance and the corporate law
literature, to our knowledge, the literature includes no data on who first drafts
the merger agreements, and under what circumstances.
The conventional wisdom is that drafting responsibility is overwhelmingly
awarded to the acquirer.' 5 Using a sample of 867 merger agreements involving
US public company targets signed between 2007 and 2016, we show that this
view is simply incorrect. For each deal, we examine the proxy statement to
determine which party provided the first draft of the agreement and how
competitive the sale process was. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we find
that initial drafting responsibility for our sample was split almost perfectly
evenly between acquirer's counsel and seller's counsel. 16 Further, we find that
the strongest predictor of which party drafts first is whether the target company
is sold in an auction process. If it is, the seller is overwhelmingly likely to draft;
if it is not, then drafting responsibility tends to rest with the acquirer.
We then turn to the task of identifying whether drafting first is associated
with more favorable deal terms for that party. We find that this is indeed the case
for some terms in the merger agreement, but not for the most monetizable

founders are incentivized to choose efficient corporate governance arrangements at the initial public
offering (IPO) stage). But see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152
U. PA. L. REv. 713, 753 (2003) (challenging the claim that corporate governance terms at the IPO stage
are efficient); Robert Dames & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protectionin IPOs, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 110-13 (2001) (finding that IPO investors
price economic terms, but not necessarily governance terms).
13. See, e.g., supra notes 10, 12.
14. This Article focuses on contractual arrangements between sophisticated parties. We note,
however, that the question of whether default terms matter has been extensively treated in the context of
consumer transactions or employee arrangements, such as end user license agreements (EULAs) or
retirement-plan choices. See, e.g., John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for
Retirement Saving Outcomes:Evidencefrom the United States, in LESSONS FROM PENSION REFORM IN
THIE AMERICAS, 59 (Stephen J. Kay & Tapen Sinha eds., 2008); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are "Pay
Now, Terms Later" Contracts Worsefor Buyers? Evidencefrom Software License Agreements, 38 J.
LEGAL STuD. 309 (2009).
15. See, e.g., Anderson & Manns, supra note 3, at 64 (stating that "lawyers representing an
acquirer in an M&A transaction typically choose the precedent used in the deal which sets the defaults
and baselines for negotiations among the lawyers (and their clients)").
16. See infra Part H.C.
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terms. 17 Specifically, we examine the association between the merger
agreement's first drafter and four material provisions in public-company deals:
the termination fee, the reverse termination fee, the "go-shop" period, and the
"material adverse change" (or "MAC") clause. We do so separately for auction
deals and non-auction deals. In each case, we construct a matched sample of
buyer- and seller-drafted merger transactions based on propensity scores-that
is, we restrict our sample to deals that are highly similar according to various
observable characteristics, such as size, type of consideration, and so forth.
Propensity-score matching provides some assurance that the results we observe
are not driven by differences between buyer-drafted and seller-drafted deals or
statistical outliers. We then analyze the association between the four selected
non-price deal provisions and various deal characteristics, including which party
provided the first draft. We find, on average, that the go-shop and the MAC
clause in the final (executed) merger agreement are relatively more favorable to
acquirers when the acquirer provides the first draft, and relatively more favorable
to sellers when the seller provides the first draft. We find little or no evidence of
such an association for the termination fee or reverse termination fee.
To what should we attribute this limited first-drafter advantage in public
company M&A? We identify four possible drivers. One possibility is that it
reflects pure bargaining power. This assumes drafting responsibility tends to be
allocated to the party with superior bargaining power. Second, a first-drafter
advantage may result from transaction costs: negotiating the terms of a very
lengthy document takes time, such that a party preferring to sign the deal rapidly
may concede on certain terms in the initial draft even if it finds them
suboptimal.1 8 A third possibility is that the terms first proposed by the drafting
party have an "anchoring" or "framing" effect on the counterparty-a form of
cognitive bias.19 The final hypothesis concerns the role of lawyers in these
transactions. If drafting responsibilities are typically assigned to the more
experienced counsel, then that law firm may obtain more advantageous terms for
its client through better negotiating skills or better market information, for
instance. Alternatively, agency costs in the lawyer-client relationship could lead
the drafting law firm to waste time negotiating terms with immaterial payoffs,
or, conversely, lead the non-drafting law firm to negotiate only those terms that
are most salient to its client.
While we cannot provide a definitive theoretical answer, we find evidence
that supports some of these theories over others. Notably, we show that
transaction costs associated with the M&A negotiation process, and lawyer
agency costs, may play an important role in fixing deal terms. By design, we

17. See infra Part IV.
In effect, this may be viewed as a particular form of bargaining power. If the drafting party
18.
is less affected by the passage of time (that is, less "impatient" in the language of bargaining theory)
than its counterparty, then the drafting party thus acquires bargaining power.
19. See sources cited infra note 43.
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examine very different types of M&A deal terms. 20 The termination fee and
reverse termination fee are highly salient, are specified numerically, and are
easily translated into (expected) dollar amounts. Therefore these terms are
obvious points of negotiation for the parties themselves. By contrast, the MAC
clause is a complex, non-numerical term that tends to be negotiated exclusively
by counsel. The go-shop period term lies somewhere in between: although it is
specified numerically (in terms of days), it is not readily converted into dollars
and cents by the parties, and is far less salient to the parties than the termination
fee or reverse termination fee. Thus, the fact that we find evidence of a firstdrafter advantage for the go-shop fee and the MAC clause, but not for the
termination fee and reverse termination fee, is consistent with the negotiation
process itself affecting final terms. A party's impatience to get the deal done may
cause it to concede to the drafting party on terms that require time and expertise
to negotiate and that are difficult to value, but not on the most fundamental
economic terms. These findings are not consistent with behavioral anchoring
explanations, however: providing the initial draft does not lead to a meaningful
advantage for the termination or reverse termination fee provisions, which are
the most salient of the four provisions that we examine.
Whatever the explanation, our results cast doubt on both the classical
prediction that parties will always agree to efficient terms and the view that
drafting first provides a clear advantage. The answer lies somewhere in between.
We provide evidence that there is a first-mover advantage even in major
transactions among highly sophisticated, informed parties, but that this
advantage dissipates for terms that are easy to monetize.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews the theoretical and
empirical literatures on the determinants of M&A contract terms. Part II provides
background on the negotiation of merger agreements and presents competing
hypotheses that we wish to test, as to how non-price terms are determined in
merger agreements. Part III describes the construction of our dataset. Part IV
provides the results of our data analyses, suggesting that there is indeed a limited
first-drafter advantage in M&A. Part V addresses potential objections, including
the contention that MAC clause drafting is immaterial. Appendix A describes
our methodology for creating various measures of the MAC clause's value to the
seller versus its value to the acquirer, while Appendix B provides detail on which
law firms tend to draft first and under what circumstances.

20.

See infra Part II.B.
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I.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

A.

Efficient Bargainingin M&A Transactions

While contract theory has long been a topic of research, considerable work
remains to be done in understanding precisely what determines the final terms
agreed to by the parties. Contract theorists often divide agreement terms into
21
"price terms" and "non-price terms." Non-price terms are components of the
bargain intended to create value for one or both parties, while price terms indicate
how that value is split between them. 22 When purchasing a new car, for example,
the seller warranty would be a non-price term, while the total amount payable to
the dealership would be the price term.
Over the years, scholars have considered whether bargaining power
23
imbalances among the parties affect non-price terms. Scholars have also
focused on the role played by the parties' agents in negotiating and even
designing non-price terms. 24 For large transactions such as M&A deals, lawyers
tend to be primarily responsible for negotiating the non-price terms of the key
contracts. 25 Do lawyers themselves affect the final terms agreed to by the parties,
and if so, by what means?
For decades, a widespread position in the field of law and economics has
been that factors such as bargaining power and the negotiation process have no
26
effect on the final non-price terms to which the parties agree. Instead, the
parties are always incentivized to agree to the non-price terms that maximize
their joint surplus from the transaction (the "efficient" terms), after which they
will split this surplus through the price term, according to their relative
bargaining power. 27 Any term for which the benefit to one party outweighs the

21. See, e.g., Choi & Triantis, supranote 7 at 1667.
22. But see id. at 1667 n.2 (noting the difficulty of distinguishing between price terms and nonprice terms).
23. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract,43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943) (arguing that the imbalance in bargaining power between
the parties to a contract of adhesion can result in contract terms that are not socially optimal).
24. See infra notes 39-44.
25. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89
CALIF. L. REv. 1301, 1301 (2001) [hereinafter Coates, Explaining Variation]("Together, these findings
provide strong evidence that lawyers determine key terms in the 'corporate contract,' due to agency
costs between owner-managers and their lawyers.").
26. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, NaturalMonopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548
(1969); George L. Priest, A Theory ofthe Consumer ProductWarranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981); Alan
Schwartz, A Reexamination ofNonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977).
27. In the case of an M&A transaction, the parties' joint surplus would be the sum of (1) the
difference between the acquirer's willingness to pay and the acquirer's aggregate payoff from the
agreed-upon terms and (2) the difference between the seller's aggregate payoff and the seller's
reservation price. Note, therefore, that the "efficient" terms are not those that split surplus evenly
between the parties. In fact, the efficient terms may be very one-sided in favor of a particular party, if
the payoff they produce for that party is so large that it outweighs the harm to the other party.

2019]

IS THERE A FIRST-DRAFTER AD VANTAGE IN M&A?

1127

cost to the other is an "efficient" term. In choosing which terms to agree to, the
hypothesis goes, a party takes into account the costs and benefits (the "payoff")
not only to itself, but also to its counterparty. As long as the joint net payoff for
any term is positive, the parties should both be willing to agree to it. 28 Intuitively,
the idea is that the parties will both do better if they make the pie as large as
possible before bargaining over how to split it.
If this hypothesis is correct, it implies that bargaining power should affect
only the price term(s) of voluntary bargains, and not the non-price terms. 29 In
this view, if the non-price terms in a contract between sophisticated parties
appear to be unfavorable to one side, this is not because that party lacks
bargaining power, but rather because the terms are "efficient": the collective
benefit to the parties from each of these terms outweighs their costs, so both
parties have an incentive to agree to them. The parties can then divide the
collective surplus from these terms through the price term, and it is there-and
only there-that bargaining power comes into play. A corollary of the prediction
that parties to a voluntary agreement will inevitably agree to efficient non-price
terms is thus that other factors, such as bargaining power, the negotiation
process, and negotiating skill, have no effect on the final non-price terms. This
"irrelevance proposition," as Albert Choi and George Triantis call it, has been a
defining feature of much of the study of contracts in law and economics.30
As an illustration, imagine two parties, A and B, negotiating a simple
transaction. During the course of negotiations, they consider four potential nonprice terms to include in their agreement. If included, each such term would be
expected to generate a particular payoff (positive or negative) for A and for B.
These expected payoffs are reported in Table 1 below. We assume for
simplicity's sake that both parties are aware of each other's expected payoff from
any given term.
Table 1. Expected Payoffs from Non-Price Terms: Example.
Expected Payoffs
Term 1
Term 2
Term 3
Term 4
Party A
+$5
+$10
-$7
-$4
Party B
+$3
-$6
-$8
+$3
Which terms, if any, should the parties include in their bargain? If Term 1
were included in the agreement, it would be expected to increase Party A's payoff
by $5 and Party B's payoff by $3. Both parties therefore benefit from this term
and would readily agree to include it in their agreement. Term 2, on the other
hand, should increase Party A's payoff (by $10), but decrease Party B's payoff

28. See Avinash Dixit& Susan Skeath, GAMES OF STRATEGY 571-72 (2d ed. 2004) (illustrating
the Nash model of cooperative bargaining).
29. But see generally Choi & Triantis, supra note 7 (explaining-and critiquing-the theory
that bargaining power does not affect non-price terms).
30. See id. at 1675-77 (describing several circumstances in which the irrelevance proposition
may be violated).
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(by $6). Should Party B therefore refuse the term? The answer is no, because the
benefit to Party A from Term 2 is larger than the cost the term imposes on Party
B. Party A should be willing to pay Party B-through adjustment of the price
term of this agreement-at least enough to make Party B whole, in exchange for
Party B's agreement to include the term.
Thus, although Term 2 imposes a cost on Party B, Party B will agree to it,
because the parties' joint payoff from the term-$10 minus $6-is positive.
Term 3 imposes a cost on both parties and will therefore not be included. Term
4 also will not be included, because although it provides an expected benefit of
$3 to Party B, the loss of $4 to A results in a negative joint payoff to the parties
of -$1.
Thus, the parties will only agree to Term 1 and Term 2 in their transaction.
This is the set of non-price terms that maximizes their joint payoff, rather than
their individual payoffs. Indeed, this bargain results in significantly different
total payoffs for each party. Party A's expected payoff from a deal that includes
both Term 1 and Term 2 is positive: $5 + $10 = $15. Party B, by contrast, obtains
a negative expected payoff: $3 - $6 = -$3. Therefore, in order to arrive at the
efficient bargain with Term 1 and Term 2, A will have to pay B a price that is
somewhere between $3 and $15-$3 being the minimum amount B would
3
accept, and $15 being the maximum amount A would pay for such terms. This
simple example illustrates the logic behind the standard law and economics
prediction that rational parties to a voluntary bargain will agree to the efficient
set of non-price terms-that is, to the non-price terms that maximize their joint
payoff.
B.

Departuresfrom Efficient Bargaining

Recently, however, strict adherence to the theory of efficient bargaining
and to the irrelevance principle have been challenged on both theoretical and
empirical grounds. Choi and Triantis argue that in certain negotiations,
bargaining power can both (1) alter the set of terms that would be efficient for
32
the parties and (2) lead parties to agree to inefficient terms. They provide a
detailed taxonomy of the various sources of bargaining power and model certain
cases in which bargaining power can affect non-price terms. These cases include
(1) transactions, including mergers and acquisitions, in which the price term is
negotiated and effectively fixed before the non-price terms are, and (2)
33
transactions involving asymmetric information.

How the parties will ultimately end up splitting the price term depends on factors such as
31.
their outside options (also known as their reservation values) and their relative bargaining power.
Different bargaining models predict different splits of the $12 surplus from the transaction.
32. Choi & Triantis, supra note 29, at 1678.
33. See also Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case
ofCorporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 873 (2013).
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Another approach to challenging the efficiency of M&A terms examines
the specific process by which they are negotiated, and by whom. For example,
certain merger agreement terms may be partially determined by considerations
extending beyond the payoffs to the individual parties. Marcel Kahan and
Michael Klausner have argued that "boilerplate" terms in merger agreements
reflect learning and network externalities. 34 This means that, while considered in
a vacuum, boilerplate terms may not be efficient for the negotiating parties, the
parties are incentivized to adopt them simply because a large number of third
parties has adopted them. The benefits of having shared understandings of and
experiences with boilerplate terms within the larger market may be sufficiently
large that the parties will choose not to deviate from such terms, even if they
would have selected different terms in the absence of such externalities.
Relatedly, Robert Anderson and Jeffrey Manns advocate for greater
standardization in M&A practice.35 They find that M&A agreements derive from
a vast set of different precedent forms, on a seemingly ad hoc basis, and argue
that this lack of standardization is inefficient.3 6 They claim that, on average,
M&A clients would obtain better outcomes at lower cost if law firms were
willing to coordinate to develop a standard set of forms and commit to spending
less time modifying them. 37
As the primary agents responsible for negotiating merger agreements,
lawyers may shape the non-price terms of M&A deals in ways that depart from
the efficient bargain. Through several empirical studies, John Coates shows that
law firm experience has a significant effect on the final terms of M&A
contracts. 38 As Coates recognizes, however, it is not necessarily clear that more
experienced counsel leads to more efficient terms. Coates marshals many
examples in which experienced counsel proves instrumental in developing new,
value-increasing terms; however, he also provides some evidence that, by siding
with management for agency-cost reasons, these lawyers introduce terms in
corporate transactions that may be value-decreasing for investors. 39 C. N. V.

34. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting, 83 VA. L. REv. 713, 766 (1997).
35. Anderson & Manns, supra note 3, at 61-62.
36.
See id.
37. Other scholars have highlighted the extent to which merger agreement provisions are pathdependent E.g., Matthew Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REv. 71
(2018).
38. See Coates IV, Explaining Variation, supra note 25, at 1385-86 (2001) (focusing on
takeover defenses); John C. Coates IV, Managing Disputes through Contract: Evidence from M&A, 2
HARV. Bus. L.REv. 295, 336-37 (2012) (focusing on dispute management provisions); John C. Coates,
IV, Allocating Risk Through Contract: Evidence from M&A and Policy Implications 43 (Aug. 22, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://ssm.com/abstract-2133343 [https://perma.cc/S97599US] (examining all risk-shifting provisions in M&A contracts).
39. See Coates IV, Explaining Variation, supra note 25, at 1311-12. Because managers, rather
than investors, select a firm's counsel, there is the potential for an agency problem whereby experienced
counsel may write in terns that provide greater private benefits for management (such as higher
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Krishnan and Ronald Masulis find that law firms with the greatest share of the
M&A advisory market are associated with key positive outcomes for their clients
(such as higher deal completion rates and higher takeover premia, on the
acquirer's side), suggesting a value-increasing contribution from experienced
firms. 40 Using a sample of private merger agreements from a single Dutch law
firm, Christel Karsten, Ulrike Malmendier and Zacharias Sautner find that
individual lawyer expertise is also associated with better client outcomes in
M&A negotiations. 4 1 By contrast, a study by Anderson and Manms suggests that
shareholders do not price merger agreement provisions, thereby calling into
42
question the value of lawyers' time and effort in negotiating these terms.
With these competing positions on the efficiency of M&A tenns in mind,
we consider a context in which the irrelevance principle would seem most likely
to hold: bilateral negotiations between highly sophisticated parties with ample
resources, in which transaction costs are small relative to the size of the deal.
Specifically, we look at whether the final terms agreed to by parties to a merger
agreement differ according to which party provided the first draft. As noted
earlier, the irrelevance principle predicts that there would be no association
between first-drafter status and the final value of the merger agreement terms.
In contrast to the irrelevance proposition, various other theories could
support the association between first-drafter status and relatively more favorable
M&A deal terms. First, in a process referred to in the behavioral economics and
negotiations literature as "framing" or "anchoring," the initial set of terms
proposed in a negotiation may influence what the other party views as
43
reasonable, or what it believes the drafting party's reservation price to be.

compensation, lower risk of personal liability, more protection against being replaced by new managers,
etc.) than investors would prefer. This deviates from the efficient terms.
40. See C.N.V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and Merger and
Acquisition Outcomes, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 220 (2013).
41. See Christel Karsten, Ulrike Malmendier & Zacharias Sautner, Lawyer Expertise and
Contract Design - Evidence from M&A Negotiations 22 (Jan. 28, 2019) (working paper), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract-2576866 [https://perma.cc/6MHQ-JX6K].
42. Jeffrey Manns & Robert Anderson, The Merger Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
1143, 1154, 1186 (2013) (using an event-study design to show that the market does not react to the
disclosure of acquisition agreements in the one to four days following the merger announcement). But
see John C. Coates, Darius Palia & Ge Wu, Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to Bidder and
at
available
paper),
(working
2018)
22,
(June
3
Shareholders?
Target
https://ssm.com/abstract-3201235 [https://perma.cc/JLV9-UQ43](finding evidence that specific M&A
contract clauses do affect stock returns for the bidder and target upon announcement, suggesting that
deal lawyer expertise aids with efficient contracting).
43. See Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The Role of
Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 657, 667 (2001);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgmentunder Uncertainty:HeuristicsandBiases, 185 SCIENCE
1124, 1131 (1974). In contract, the "status quo bias" describes a similar phenomenon for default rules.
See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and ContractDefaultRules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608, 67576 (1998). But see Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, ContractLaw and the Limits ofContract, 113 YALE
L.J. 541, 551-52 n.18 (2003) (suggesting that the status quo bias is less likely to apply where the parties
are sophisticated repeat players).
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Indeed, there is empirical evidence in the M&A context of such anchoring effects
on the price term itself. Malcolm Baker, Xin Pan and Jeffrey Wurgler find that
the target company's most recent peak in stock price biases both the amount of
the acquirers' offers and the likelihood that the target will accept an offer.4
Second, if first drafters tend to end up with more favorable terms than their
counterparties, all else equal, this might simply be a reflection of the drafting
party's superior bargaining power. Indeed, the first drafter not necessarily
randomly assigned: in many cases, one could imagine, the party with superior
bargaining power is given the opportunity to provide the first draft for precisely
that reason. If Choi and Triantis are correct that bargaining power can affect nonprice terms, then this would lead us to observe an association between firstdrafter status and more favorable non-price terms.
Third, various transaction costs, agency costs, and other frictions involved
in the negotiation process (such as lawyer time and effort) could provide the firstdrafting party with an advantage in negotiating non-price terms. Because of these
costs, parties may be less likely to depart entirely from a one-sided first draft to
reach the efficient draft.45
Fourth, if the more experienced law firm between acquirer's counsel and
seller's counsel tends to be assigned the task of providing the first draft, then, as
discussed above, such experience could lead to more favorable outcomes for that
client. We revisit each of these hypotheses in discussing the empirical results
reported in Part V.
II.
BACKGROUND

A.

Merger Transactionsand the Role ofLawyers

The most common means of acquiring a public company is through a
merger. 46 A merger has the same effect as purchasing 100 percent of the
outstanding shares of the target, giving the acquirer complete control of the target
business. At the same time, a merger only requires approval of a majority of the
target shareholders under state law.47 If the acquirer is an existing operating
company (a "strategic" buyer), the acquirer's goal may be to derive synergies
from combining the acquirer and target businesses or to gain market power by

44. See Malcolm Baker, Xin Pan & Jeffrey Wurgler, The Effect ofReference Point Prices on
Mergers andAcquisitions, 106 J. FIN. EcON. 49, 70 (2012).
45. See Ben-Shahar& White, supra note 6, at 981-82 (finding that being differentially affected
by negotiating and drafting transactions costs may illustrate yet another form of bargaining power
imbalance).
46.

See PRACTICAL LAW CORPORATE & SECURITIES, BUYOUTS: OVERVIEW (maintained),

West Practical Law, Practice Note 4-381-1368.
47.

2014).

See ROBERT B. THOMPSON, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: LAW AND FINANCE 26 (2d ed.
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absorbing a competitor.48 If the acquirer is an investment fund, such as a private
equity fund (a "financial" buyer), the target company is likely to be held on a
standalone basis as a portfolio investment and then resold after a few years.49
Public company merger transactions involve multiple stages, which may be
divided into (1) negotiation, (2) signing, (3) pre-closing, (4) closing, and (5) postclosing. Our focus here is on the first three stages. Negotiations begin either
when an interested party approaches the target (or vice versa), or when the target
explicitly solicits indications of interest from a wide field of potential
candidates-a process that we will refer to as an "auction." Depending on the
particular path chosen, therefore, the preliminary negotiations may be bilateral
(between a single potential acquirer and the target) or multilateral (between
several interested bidders and the target, in the auction format). Given the capital
at stake and the potential for litigation, the parties will typically be advised by
counsel from the very earliest discussions. On the target company side, in
addition to counsel for the target itself, independent board members may engage
their own counsel, if they are concerned about conflicts of interest involving
50
insider board members.
The parties may exchange various informal or formal indications of
interest, often culminating in a signed letter of intent and term sheet, though these
are typically not intended to be legally binding. Once the parties have reached
broad agreement on major deal points, counsel for one side will begin drafting
the merger agreement. After negotiating and revising the merger agreement
extensively, the acquirer and target may eventually execute it (an event referred
to as "signing"). The merger agreement is a lengthy, complex contract51
governing the parties' rights and obligations between (1) the signing date and (2)
the date on which the merger is actually consummated and the consideration is
paid to the target shareholders (the "closing date"). With public company
mergers (that is, mergers in which the target is a public company), the period
between signing and closing may last from several months to more than one
year.5 2 This gap allows time for the parties to obtain all necessary regulatory
48. See id. at 11-12.
49. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 121, 125 (2009). In either case, the target company is typically merged with a newly formed
shell entity created by the acquirer but may instead be merged with an entity that already conducts
business.
See Thompson, supra note 47, at 130.
50.
51.
See John C. Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years
of Deals 3 (2016) (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 333),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=2862019 [https://perma.cc/J4P9-BFTK] [hereinafter Coates IV,
Why Have M&A Contracts Grown?] (finding that merger agreements have become vastly longer and
more complex over a twenty-year period).
52. For example, AT&T's acquisition of Time Warner closed in June 2018-almost two years
after the parties signed the merger agreement. See Cecilia Kang & Edmund Lee, AT&T-Time Warner
Deal Approval Gets Justice Department Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, (July 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/business/justice-department-plans-appeal-of-att-time-wamermerger-approval.html [https://perma.cc/XH9F-UA62].
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approvals (such as approval from antitrust authorities), for the acquirer to finalize
financing for the transaction, for the target to hold the shareholders' meeting at
which they must vote to approve the merger, and even to allow for other potential
acquirers to make superior bids for the firm.s3
Merger agreements are not drafted from scratch: the law firm or, rarely, inhouse counsel, assigned the task of drafting the agreement, always begins from
a precedent form. 54 The particular precedent form selected for a transaction
might be, among others: (a) the law firm's standard form merger agreement, if
any; (b) the most recent merger agreement prepared by the firm for the same
client; (c) the most recent merger agreement for the same client prepared by
another firm; (d) the most comparable recent deal done by the firm for another
client; (e) a form recommended by the client's financial advisor; or (f) a
precedent form mutually agreed to by the parties in preliminary discussions.
In any event, the drafting law firm typically modifies the precedent form
considerably before circulating it to the other side,55 whether one believes these
edits to be primarily substantive56 or mere "churing."57 These modifications
have several different plausible goals, such as tailoring the terms to the needs of
the parties or their particular business arrangement, signaling information,
upgrading to the most recent "market" terms, addressing regulatory
developments, or even providing tangible evidence to the client of lawyer effort
(even with no measurable impact on substance). Most relevant for our purposes,
the drafting lawyers will also modify the precedent form to produce a first draft
that includes terms more favorable to the drafters than those they expect to retain
in the final agreement. Thus, the expectation across deals is that acquirer's
counsel will prepare a buyer-friendly first draft, while seller's counsel will
prepare a seller-friendly one. (In fact, many firms that develop a standard
precedent form explicitly create alternate seller-favorable or buyer-favorable
versions of particular terms or of the entire agreement for just this purpose.)
Counsel's implicit hope, of course, is to retain as many of these favorable terms
in the final agreement as possible, without affecting the parties' agreement on
the price term(s).
As discussed, however, many of these goals conflict with the traditional
law and economics proposition that bargaining power and default terms do not
affect the parties' ultimate bargain with respect to non-price terms. We continue
this section with a discussion of the four key non-price terms in merger
agreements on which we base the empirical tests described in Part IV.

53.
See Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown?, supra note 51, at 8.
54. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 3, at 61.
55.
See id. at 75-77.
56.
See Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown?, supra note 51, at 2.
57.
See Anderson & Manns, supra note 3, at 68, 76, 88 (noting that transactional attorneys have
perverse incentives to go through inefficient processes or spend time on immaterial negotiations to
generate billable hours).
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Prominent Terms in M&A Agreements

Merger agreements commonly leave the door open for one or the other
party to terminate the merger agreement prior to consummation of the merger.
The reasons for these escape hatches are many, but we focus primarily on three.
First, directors' fiduciary duties under state corporate law may prohibit the target
from signing a merger agreement that leaves the board no room to consider
subsequent better offers.58 In order to preserve the board's flexibility in the
merger agreement, the target may negotiate for the right to affirmatively seek
superior bids for a period of time after signing (the "go-shop" period)59 or simply
to accept superior unsolicited bids. Should the target choose to accept such a bid
and terminate the original merger agreement, it must pay a "termination fee"
(often 2 to 4 percent of deal value) to the acquirer. 60
Second, due to events occurring between signing and closing, an acquirer
may no longer have the practical ability to follow through with the merger, such
as when it fails to secure financing. Anticipating this possibility, the parties may
provide that if the acquirer terminates the merger agreement for this reason, it
must pay a fee (the "reverse termination fee") to the target.61
Third, merger agreements virtually always provide that if the target is
deemed to have experienced a material adverse change between signing and
closing, the acquirer may terminate the merger agreement without paying
anything whatsoever to the target (the "MAC" clause). 6 2 This Sub-Part B
describes the four provisions introduced above, all of which deal with the
possibility of terminating the merger agreement prior to closing.
1.

Termination Fee.

The termination fee (or "break-up" fee) is the amount payable by the target
to the acquirer if the target elects to terminate the merger agreement; this may
happen if the target fails to obtain the requisite shareholder approval for the
merger, or if the board of directors decides to pursue an alternative transaction
with a party offering a higher price for the target.63 The purpose of including a
termination fee provision in the merger agreement is to compensate the acquirer
for expenses and opportunity costs in the event that the merger agreement is so
terminated by the seller, and to provide the acquirer with some certainty that the
merger will be consummated as planned.
A large termination fee can operate as a deal protection device, howeverthat is, it can materially reduce the target's incentives to back out of the executed

See Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935-36 (Del. 2003).
58.
See infra Part II.B.3.
59.
See infra Part I.B.1.
60.
61.
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.4.
62.
See Brian J.M. Quinn, Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 79963.
801 (2010).
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merger agreement. Courts are generally wary of deal protection devices in
merger agreements, because these render the target less receptive to other
potential transactions, even those priced significantly higher." When the target
board chooses to put the company in play, Delaware law may require the board
to seek a transaction that maximizes the return to shareholders. 65 This may
require the board to remain open to bids for the target on better terms, even after
the target has signed an acquisition agreement with a bidder. If the agreement
signed includes excessive deal protection, the target may have no meaningful
alternative to proceeding with the original transaction, regardless of whether
superior bids arise. As a result, target directors may be deemed to have breached
their fiduciary duties to the stockholders by agreeing to excessive deal
protection. 66

Courts have therefore held in the case of termination fees that the amount
payable by the target must be reasonable and appropriate, rather than punitive.
Specifically, courts will consider whether a termination fee is so large that it
either coerces stockholders into voting in favor of the original transaction 67 (in
order to avoid causing the target to pay out the fee) or has a chilling effect on
other potential bidders for the target.6 8 In practice, the Delaware Court of
Chancery has held that there is no bright-line rule for the maximum permissible
value of termination fees, 69 having blessed fees as high as 5.3 percent of the
transaction value.7 0 Termination fees in the range of 2 to 4 percent of the
transaction value are routinely agreed to in public company mergers.
2.

Reverse Termination Fee.

A reverse termination fee (or "reverse break-up" fee), is an amount the
acquirer pays to the seller if the acquirer breaches the merger agreement; this
may happen, for example, when it is unable to close because it has failed to
obtain the necessary financing to pay the merger consideration.71 The reverse

64. See Sean J. Griffith, Deal ProtectionProvisionsin the LastPeriodofPlay, 71 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1899, 1903-04 (2002) (describing Delaware case law criticizing or invalidating deal protection).
65. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
66.
See Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936, 939 (Del. 2003).
67.
See In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. S'holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 197 (Del. Ch. 2007).
68. See McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505-06 (Del. Ch. 2000) (determining that
while a 3.5 percent termination fee may "rebuff a bidder who wished to top [the] bid by a relatively
insignificant amount," it was not a material obstacle); see also In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig.,
877 A.2d 975, 1017-19 (Del. Ch. 2005) (permitting a 3.75 percent termination fee).
69. See In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 503 (Del. Ch. 2010); La. Mun. Police
Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n. 10 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Netsmart Tech.,
Inc. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d at 197.
70.
See In re BioClinica, Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 5631233, at *2-3 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (allowing a termination fee of $6.5 million in a deal valued at $123 million).
71. There is a robust, but conflicting, literature on whether termination fees and reverse
termination fees are efficient or reflect agency costs or other inefficiencies. See, e.g., Paul Andr6, Samer
Khalil & Michel Magnan, Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions: Protecting Investors or
Managers?, 34 J. Bus. FiN. & ACCT. 541 (2007) (suggesting termination fees are usually efficient);
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termination fee gained popularity with the increase in acquisitions by private
equity funds, which, unlike most strategic buyers, depend on debt financing from
third parties in order to pay the merger price. 72 Nonetheless, reverse termination
fees appear in deals involving both financial and strategic buyers.
Reverse termination fees may be likened to liquidated damages
provisions. 73 Initially, market practice tended towards setting reverse termination
fees equal to or approximately equal to the termination fee in the same merger
agreement, suggesting that the parties viewed them as symmetrical obligations
of the buyer and seller.74 The symmetry is illusory, however. Directors owe
heightened fiduciary duties to shareholders only when they are selling control of
their companies; these duties are not in effect when they are purchasers. Thus,
the fiduciary duty considerations that limit the amount of termination fees do not
apply to reverse termination fees. This explains why recently buyers have agreed
to reverse termination fees that are significantly larger than the seller's
termination fee, averaging 6.76 percent of the transaction value in leveraged
public company mergers in 2017.75
In Part IV, we look for evidence of a first-drafter advantage on both of these
fees, using our sample of merger agreements. For each agreement in the sample,

Thomas W. Bates & Michael L. Lemmon, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do?An Analysis ofTerminationFee
Provisions and Merger Outcomes, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 469 (2003) (concluding that termination fees are
efficient and provide value); Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, How Are Firms Sold?, 62 J. Fin.
847 (2007); John C. Coates IV, Darius Palia & Ge Wu, Reverse TerminationFees in M&A (forthcoming
2018), available at https://ssm.com/abstract-3016785 [https://perma.cc/S6JU-DVM7] (suggesting
some negative and inefficient impacts of certain reverse terminations fees); Jin Q. Jeon & James A.
Ligon, How Much Is Reasonable? The Size of Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions, 17 J.
CORP. FIN. 959 (2011) (concluding that small to moderate termination fees are efficient while larger fees
suggest agency conflicts); Micab S. Officer, Termination Fees in Mergers andAcquisitions, 69 J. FIN.
ECON. 431 (2003) (finding that termination fees tend to be beneficial); Brian J.M. Quinn, supra note 63
(concluding that reverse termination fees may be insufficient); Femdn Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian,
The Effect ofProhibitingDealProtection in M&A, 60 J.L. & ECON. 75 (2017) (finding that eliminating
deal protection measures did not improve shareholder value); Fem6n Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian,
The New Look ofDealProtection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013 (2017).
72. Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation ofDeal Risk Through Reverse Termination
Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1163, 1170 (2010).
Prior to our sample period, reverse termination fee provisions in merger agreements often
73.
amounted to a simple option for the acquirer to abandon the transaction upon payment of a large fee.
Following the failed leveraged buyouts of the 2008 financial crisis, however, this model was abandoned
in favor of a more restrictive one where, in most circumstances, an acquirer's damages extend beyond
mere payment of the reverse termination fee. See PRACTICAL LAW, REVERSE BREAK-UP FEES AND
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: A SURVEY OF REMEDIES IN LEVERAGED PUBLIC DEALS 2018 EDITION, 2,4-

5 (2018), West Practical Law, Article W-014-1867 [hereinafter PRACTICAL LAW, 2018 SURVEY OF
REMEDIES].
74.
See PRACTICAL LAW CORPORATE & SECURITIES, PRACTICE NOTE: REVERSE BREAK-UP

FEES AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (maintained), West Practical Law, Practice Note 6-386-5096.
See PRACTICAL LAW, 2018 SURVEY OF REMEDIES, supra note 73, at 11. For example, the
75.
reverse termination fee in Pfizer's 2009 merger agreement with Wyeth was 6.62 percent. Agreement
and Plan of Merger among Pfizer Inc., Wagner Acquisition Corp. and Wyeth § 8.2(e), Jan. 25, 2009,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5187/000119312509014288/dex2l.htm
[https://perma.cc/A WP7-UKDS].
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we code the value of both the reverse termination fee and the termination fee as
a percentage of the total transaction value. We note, however, that many deals
do not include a reverse termination fee, such as when the acquirer does not
intend to rely on third-party financing to pay the merger consideration.
Moreover, the conditions under which the reverse termination fee are payable
and the accompanying remedies (such as specific performance) for the acquirer's
breach of the merger agreement, are not uniform across deals.76
3.

Go-Shop Period.

The "go-shop period" is a provision that explicitly permits the target to
solicit and negotiate higher offers from other parties for a period of time after
signing.77 We code the length of the go-shop period, which typically ranges from
twenty-five to fifty days from the date on which the merger agreement was
executed. Most merger agreements in our sample do not contain a go-shop
provision, however, which is consistent with reports that the provision is
relatively rare78 and largely confined to deals involving private equity buyers. 79
While negotiating for a go-shop provision seems to suggest that the target board
wishes to foster a competitive sale process, the cynical view is that "go-shops"
are used as substitutes for proper auctions and induce less competition. Target
management may prefer the insulation that a go-shop provides, because a
favored private equity buyer may be willing to provide management with more
private benefits than other bidders, for example.s0
4.

The MAC Clause.

The "material adverse change" ("MAC") clause is one of the most heavily
negotiated provisions in a merger agreement, and has given rise to a considerable
amount of litigation and commentary.8 1 The MAC clause plays several key roles

76. See Coates, Palia & Wu, supra note 71 (documenting variation in the features of reverse
termination fee provisions, beyond the amount of the fee itself); see generally PRACTICAL LAW, 2018
SURVEY OF REMEDIES, supra note 73.

77. Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and
Implications, 69 Bus. Law. 729, 730 (2008).
78. For a discussion of the evolution of go-shop provisions, see Christina Sautter, Shopping
DuringExtended Store Hours: From No-Shops to Go-Shops, 73 BRoOK. L. REV. 525 (2008).
79.

See PRACTICAL LAW CORPORATE & SECURTHES, NO-SHOPS AND THEIR EXCEPTIONS, 8,9

(maintained), West Practical Law, Practice Note 8-386-1078 [hereinafter PRACTICAL LAW, NO-SHOPS
AND THEIR EXCEPTIONS].

80. J. Russel Denton, Stacked Deck: Go-Shops and Auction Theory, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1529,
1542-43 (2008). But see Zhe Wang, Structuring M&A Offers: Auctions, Negotiations and Go-Shop
Provisions
5
(2016)
(working
paper,
Stanford
University),
available
at
https://ssm.com/abstract-2925018 [https://perma.cc/Q6SK-RJ3K] (suggesting that go-shop provisions
are common in private equity deals where other financial bidders are likely to have similar valuations of
the target).
81.
See infra notes 139-168 and accompanying text. Today, this clause is more commonly
referred to as the "material adverse event" or "material adverse effect" (MAE) clause.
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in merger agreements. 82 Most importantly, it grants the acquirer a right to walk
away from the transaction (technically, a right to terminate the merger
agreement) without paying the seller any compensation or damages if the target
company experiences a major impairment to its business between signing and
closing. The provision is thus designed to allocate the risk of such an event to
the seller, which continues to own and control the target company during this
interim period. Because the remedy is so drastic, however, sellers negotiate
fiercely to narrow the scope of the clause and to introduce broad exceptions to
its application.8 3
MAC clauses may enhance the value of a merger transaction in one of many
ways. A well-negotiated MAC clause may allow the target to signal private
information to the buyer, place incentives on the target to maintain firm value
84
between signing and closing, and minimize overall transaction costs.
Unlike the termination fee, reverse termination fee, or go-shop period, the
MAC clause is not specified numerically: it is a complex, lengthy definition,
involving numerous exceptions and provisos. In our sample of public company
merger agreements, typical MAC definitions range anywhere from three hundred
to eight hundred words. For purposes of the empirical tests described in Part IV,
we coded the MAC definition from each merger agreement in our dataset and
developed an index (referred to hereinafter as the "MAC index") measuring how

82. The MAC clause frequently sets the threshold for when individual representations and
warranties in the merger agreement are deemed to have been breached. For example, the seller might
represent that the target company has not experienced any losses relating to litigation that "would
reasonably be expected" to have a Material Adverse Effect on the target. For private company targets,
breach of a representation or warranty by the target frequently gives the acquirer the right to
indemnification from the target post-closing. For public company mergers, however, the merger
agreement typically does not include any such indemnification right, due to the difficulty of collecting
funds post-closing from dispersed former shareholders. We therefore do not discuss this function of the
MAC clause hereafter.
83. Although one can easily describe the merger agreement provisions that make use of the
MAC definition, there remains considerable disagreement over the fundamental purposes of the
provision. See Choi & Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in ContractDesign, supra note 33, at 883-96
(reviewing several possible explanations for MAC clauses); Ronald Gilson & Alan Schwartz,
UnderstandingMACs: Moral Hazardin Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 30 (2005) (concluding that
MAC clauses protect buyers in the event that the combination is ultimately of low value); Robert T.
Miller, Cancelingthe Deal: Two Models ofMaterialAdverse Change Clauses in Business Combination
Agreements, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 99 (2009) (viewing MAC clauses as efficiency devices for
appropriating risks to the party best placed to address them); Andrew A. Schwartz, A "StandardClause
Analysis" of the FrustrationDoctrine and the MaterialAdverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789
(2010); Eric L. Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and ContractualConditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L.
755 (2009) (concluding that MAC clauses are a form of ambiguity aversion rather than risk aversion).
There is also disagreement over how significant the provision actually is, given that courts virtually
never find MAC provisions to have been triggered. But see David J. Denis & Antonio J. Macias,
MaterialAdverse Change Clauses and AcquisitionsDynamics, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
819 (2013) (providing evidence that MAC provisions do have a material impact on M&A terms and
outcomes); Antonio J. Macias & Thomas Moeller, Target Signaling with Material Adverse Change
Clausesin MergerAgreements, 39 J. EMPIRIcAL FIN. 69 (2016) (same).
84. Choi & Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in ContractDesign, supra note 33, at 851.
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favorable the MAC definition is to the seller relative to the acquirer. Part V.B
addresses the question of whether different formulations of the MAC clause
should be expected to result in different payoffs to the parties. Appendix A
describes in detail our methodology for deriving the MAC index.
IlI.
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATASET

A.
1.

Merger Information

Sample ofMerger Transactions.

We begin with the complete sample of public company M&A transactions
summarized in Thomson Reuter's Practical Law database. This database is
limited to mergers in which the target was a US reporting company8 5 when the
merger agreement was signed. The database consists of (1) a selection of eleven
mergers signed in 2007, (2) all mergers signed in 2008 with a signing value of at
least $250 million, and (3) all mergers signed on or after January 1, 2009, with a
signing value of at least $100 million. 86 As of July 19, 2017, this represented a
total of 1,438 mergers. For each transaction, the Practical Law database reports
or summarizes various information regarding the economic and contractual
terms of the deal and provides the names of the parties' legal and financial
advisors. Because the targets are US public companies, the proxy statements and
merger agreements are publicly available in the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC's) EDGAR database, and we extracted each one
accordingly.
2.

FirstDrafterandAuction.

We relied on the merger proxy statement prepared by the target company
to determine which side's law firm circulated the first draft of the merger
agreement, and coded this information by hand.87 State corporate law requires

85. "Reporting companies" are companies that are subject to substantial disclosure and other
obligations under Sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. A firm becomes subject
to the Exchange Act as a reporting company if (1) it offers to sell its securities to the general public; (2)
it exceeds a certain size (measured by its assets and the number of its record shareholders); or (3) its
securities are traded on a national securities exchange. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012) (prohibiting the
sale of any security unless a registration statement is effective); id. § 77e(l)(A) (declaring that the
prohibition does not apply to "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering"); id.
§ 781(g)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring a company to register its securities under the Exchange Act if it has $10
million or more in total assets and a class of equity securities "held of record" by two thousand or more
persons); id. § 781(d) (explaining when securities may be withdrawn from a national exchange). The
Practical Law sample focuses on mergers involving actual operating companies, and therefore excludes
real estate investment trusts (REITs) and debt-only issuers.
86. Practical Law began collecting and summarizing merger agreements in 2007; coverage
expanded significantly thereafter.
87. Credit and thanks are due to Robert Anderson for suggesting this approach.
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that shareholders approve mergers, typically by majority vote, with limited
exceptions.8 8 In most cases, where the target is a public company (as is the case
for all mergers in our sample), the company produces a lengthy disclosure
statement-referred to as the proxy statement-that it must both send to
shareholders and file publicly, in connection with the vote. 9 We were able to
locate the proxy statement for just over 60 percent of the merger transactions in
our dataset. 90 The section of the proxy statement entitled "Background of the
Merger" contains a detailed timeline of the events leading up to the signing of
the merger agreement, including a description of communications between the
target and all interested parties, including the eventual acquirer. In most cases,
this section states explicitly which party's counsel provided the first draft of the
merger agreement.
We also used this section of the proxy statement to code by hand whether
the target was sold in a competitive process initiated by the target (which we
refer to as an "auction") or in a purely bilateral negotiation with the eventual
acquirer (a "non-auction"). In practice, it can be difficult to gauge the degree to
9
which target boards succeeded in fostering true competition in the sale process.
In true auctions, the target engages a financial advisor at the outset to run a sale
process in which (1) the target is explicitly offered for sale to a large number of
potential bidders, and (2) the interested parties are treated on roughly equivalent
terms, such as by being required to submit formal bids on the same dates and
conduct due diligence during the same periods. In our coding, we use the term
"auction" more broadly to refer to sales processes in which the target put itself
up for sale in a competitive process. Specifically, we code as "auctions" both
true auctions and cases in which the target was in negotiations with multiple
parties simultaneously.
3.

SDC Platinum.

We supplemented the information from the merger agreements, the proxy
statements, and the Practical Law database with Thomson Reuter's SDC

88. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2017).
89. See Thompson, supra note 47, at 52 (describing the proxy solicitation process for public
company acquisitions).
90. The vast majority of the remaining deals involved tender offers, for which no proxy
statement is required.
To minimize the risk of shareholder litigation, corporate boards should rationally seek to
91.
demonstrate in the proxy statement that they conducted a fair process, designed to maximize the merger
consideration payable to shareholders in the end. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff
Solomon, Confrontingthe PeppercornSettlement in Merger Litigation:An Empirical Analysis and a
Proposalfor Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 563-65 (2015) (describing directors' fiduciary dutiesincluding a duty to provide adequate disclosure-in the context ofmergers). In particular, a board should
wish to signal that it remained open to offers from multiple parties and, ideally, actively sought
competing offers by canvassing the market Thus, in our large sample of proxy statements, it was rare
for companies to engage solely in bilateral negotiations with the eventual acquirer, without at least
discussing the possibility of a transaction with other parties.
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Platinum database of US mergers and acquisitions. 92 Among much other mergerrelated information, SDC Platinum reports the premium over the target's
publicly traded stock at various intervals from before the announcement of the
merger agreement signing. This premium equals the difference between the pershare consideration payable to shareholders upon consummation of the merger
and the target company's stock price during the relevant period prior to the
announcement. This difference is typically expressed as a percentage of the preannouncement price.
In our analysis, we use the premium that SDC Platinum calculates; its basis
is the target's stock price from four weeks prior to announcement of the deal.93
We use this premium as our primary measure of the parties' relative bargaining
power: the higher the merger premium percentage, the greater the imputed
bargaining power of the seller relative to the acquirer. However, we note that
merger premium is an imperfect measure of relative bargaining power. 94
B.

Sample Statistics

Beginning with our dataset of 1,438 public company merger transactions,
we removed the following deals from our sample:
* all mergers preceded by tender offers; 95
* all mergers that we were able to identify as affiliated
transactions, such as freeze-outs or parent-subsidiary
mergers; 96

*

all "mergers-of-equals" and other mergers for which we could
not reasonably describe one party as the "acquirer" and the

92. A study comparing SDC Platinum data to hand-coded data has identified inaccuracies in the
former, but finds that accuracy improves for deals-such as those in our sample-that are relatively
large and that occurred relatively recently. See Beau Grant Barnes, Nancy L. Harp & Derek Oler,
Evaluatingthe SDC Mergers andAcquisitionsDatabase,49 FIN. REV. 793, 815-19 (2014).
93. Note that we are only able to match 779 deals to the SDC Platinum data set and that thus the
sample is limited to that number when we include the premium in our analyses.
94. The merger premim only reveals the amount of the transaction surplus that the parties chose
to allocate to the seller in cash or stock (or perhaps both). In order to adequately measure the parties'
relative bargaining power, however, we would also need to know the overall amount of the surplus
generated by the transaction and how this surplus was split between the parties through the non-price
terms. Thus, in using the merger premium as our measure of relative bargaining power, we are implicitly
assuming either (1) that surplus is generated and split through non-price terms in the same proportions
across all deals or (2) that the amount of surplus is randomly distributed across deals, neither of which
may be valid in practice.
95. The terms of such "two-step" tender offers differ in various ways from typical merger
transactions. See Audra L. Boone, Brian J. Broughman & Antonio J. Macias, Shareholder Decision
Rights in Acquisitions: Evidence from Tender Offers 4, 7-8 (working paper, Indiana Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 331, 2017), availableat https://ssm.com/abstract-2629424 [https://perma.cc/4X8J2DPN].
96. A freeze-out merger is a transaction in which the existing controlling shareholder uses a
merger transaction to cash out minority stockholders. Fernin Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The
Effect ofDelawareDoctrine on FreezeoutStructure & Outcomes: Evidence on the UnifiedApproach,
5 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 205, 208 (2015).
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other as the "target";
* all mergers for which no proxy statement was available or for
which the proxy statement did not clearly specify which party
provided the first draft.
We were left with a final sample of 842 mergers and merger agreements,
signed from 2007 through 2016. They involve public company targets in twentythree different industries. The average deal size is nearly $5 billion. Descriptive
statistics for this sample are provided in Table 2 below, which reports the overall
means and standard deviations of selected variables, separately for non-auctions
and auctions. In this sample, all-stock consideration is relatively rare (17 percent
of deals), financial buyers are in the minority (23 percent of deals), Delaware
law is the overwhelming choice of governing law (81 percent of deals), and the
average premium is close to 37 percent. With respect to the major non-price
terms, we observe a mean termination fee of approximately 2.6 percent of the
deal value, a mean reverse termination fee of 2.2 percent of deal value, a mean
go-shop period of 4.5 days, and a mean MAC index of 11.4.97 (The higher the
MAC index, the more seller-favorable it is.)
Table 2. Final Sample of Merger Transactions: Descriptive Statistics.
Total
Auctions
Non Auctions
St. Dev.
Mean
St. Dev.
Mean
St. Dev.
Mean
All Stock
0.38
0.17
0.28
0.09
0.42
0.24
Consideration
Delaware
0.39
0.81
0.38
0.40
0.83
0.80
Governing Law
0.42
0.23
0.48
0.35
0.35
0.14
Financial Buyer
Deal Value (in
25.40
4.91
6.70
2.81
32.81
6.44
$ billions)
Premium
(n=755, No
34.79
37.07
28.73
38.04
38.65
36.36
Auction=436,
Auction=319)
Termination fee
1.10
2.64
1.02
2.79
1.14
2.53
(as % of deal
value)
Rev.
Termination
2.84
2.21
3.14
2.64
2.56
1.90
Fee (as % of
deal value)
Go-Shop
Period (in days)

4.98

13.64

3.71

11.47

4.45

12.78

97. Recall that many merger agreements in our sample do not contain a reverse termination fee,
and most do not contain a go-shop provision. Although the mean go-shop period for all deals in our
sample is approximately 4.5 days, the mean go-shop period among deals that include a go-shop
provision is approximately thirty-seven days.
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Go-Shop
Period (in days
for deals with a
go-shop>0,
n= 100, No
Auction=65,
Auction=35))
MAC Index
No. of
observations

1143

37.4

13.60

37.6

7.53

37.46

11.76

11.00

2.50

12.03

2.26

11.44

2.45

488

354

C.

842

Who Drafts First?

The primary novelty in our dataset is the addition of information about the
sales process (auction versus non-auction) and about which party provides the
first draft of the agreement. The existing literature includes surprisingly little
discussion of which party or law firm is chosen to select the merger agreement
precedent and prepare the initial draft. Where addressed, it is commonly noted
that acquirers almost always provide the first draft. 98 On this point, however, the
conventional wisdom is simply incorrect. In our final sample of public company
merger agreements, the allocation of drafting responsibility between acquirers
and sellers across all deals is split almost perfectly evenly. As reported in Table
3 below, seller's counsel provides the first draft of the merger agreement
approximately 49.9 percent of the time, versus 50.1 percent for acquirer's
counsel.
Table 3. Responsibility for First Draft of M&A Agreement.
Drafting Party
Acquirer
Seller
Total
Non-Auction

387 (79.3%)

101 (20.7%)

488 (58.0%)

Auction

35 (9.9%)

319(90.1%)

354 (42.0%)

Total

422 (50.1%)

420(49.9%)

842 (100%)

Table 3 suggests that the primary factor associated with drafting
responsibility is whether the target is sold in an auction process. In the absence
of an auction, the acquirer drafts nearly 80 percent of the time. By contrast, where
the target is sold in an auction, the roles are flipped: the seller provides the first
draft in over 90 percent of deals.
The practice of having the seller draft in auction settings is best explained
by transaction costs. When a target is offered for sale in an auction, many
potential acquirers are invited to make a bid for the company at the same time.
98. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 3, at 64 (stating that "lawyers representing an acquirer
in an M&A transaction typically choose the precedent used in the deal which sets the defaults and
baselines for negotiations among the lawyers (and their clients)").

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1144

[Vol. 107:1119

Thus, rather than negotiate entirely different merger agreements with several
parties at once, the target company can save considerable time and effort by
preparing and circulating to all bidders involved in the auction a single merger
agreement. 99 Bidders are then invited to comment on the seller's draft merger
agreement when they submit their bids.'oo Later, when auction participants
submit their bids to the target, the "bid package" consists primarily of their markup of the seller's draft merger agreement, making the participants' bids relatively
'

easy to compare.' 0
The small set of thirty-five auction deals in which the acquirer drafted first
poses something of a puzzle. Our review of the "Background of the Merger"
section in the proxy statements for these transactions suggests that in many or
most cases, the acquirer sought to preempt the auction process by putting in an
early bid and also sought to signal its strong commitment to the deal by drafting
a complete merger agreement that it was prepared to execute.
Table 4 provides cross-tabulations of the party that drafted the agreement
with other major variables. With respect to deal size, there is a fairly even split
02
between buyer drafting and seller drafting across all categories.1 When it comes
to acquirer type, the differences are more pronounced. Strategic buyers draft the
agreement just over half of the time, but financial buyers only draft
approximately a quarter of the time. We may observe this pattern because
financial buyers are more likely to acquire companies in auctions, where seller
drafting prevails. As for deal consideration, all-cash deals are drafted by the
seller approximately 61 percent of the time, while deals that include at least some
stock compensation are drafted by the buyer about two-thirds of the time.
Table 4. Cross-Tabulations of Agreement Drafter and Other Variables.

Deal Size
Less than $250M
$250M to $1B

Buyer-Drafted

Seller-Drafted

75 (56.4%)
126 (46.8%)

58 (43.6%)
143 (53.2%)

Total

133 (15.8%)
269 (31.9%)

See PRACTIcAL LAW CORPORATE & SECURTIES, AUCTIONs: FROM THE SELLER'S
99.
PERSPECTIVE (maintained) West Practical Law, Practice Note 6-383-1087.
See id.
100.
101. See id.
102. We also conduct some regression analysis to assess the factors associated with sellers
drafting merger agreements. Using non-auction deals, we run a logistic regression where the dependent
variable is a dummy for whether the seller drafted the agreement or not. We find that the only statistically
significant associations with seller drafting are the log deal size and the presence of a financial buyer.
Both of these associations are positive, which suggests that larger targets and private equity buyers are
more likely to have sellers draft the agreement. These results are consistent with smaller targets and
financial buyers exhibiting some sensitivity to legal costs. But it is difficult for us to say more about
these associations because we cannot distinguish between a number of plausible accounts. For auctions,
we do not find a statistically significant association between deal size and seller drafting, but we do find
a significant association between financial buyers and seller drafting.
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$1B to $5B
More than $5B

134 (47.3%)
87 (55.4%)

149 (52.7%)
70 (44.6%)

283 (33.6%)
157 (18.6%)

Acquirer Type
Strategic
Financial

368 (56.7%)
54 (28.0%)

281 (43.3%)
139 (72.0%)

649 (77.1%)
193 (22.9%)

Consideration Type
All Cash
All Stock
Mixed

194 (38.5%)
100 (69.4%)
128 (66.0%)

310 (61.5%)
44 (30.6%)
66 (34.0%)

504 (59.9%)
144 (17.1%)
194 (23.0%)

D.
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Law Firm Involvement in M&A Transactions

The Practical Law database includes the names of the law firms that
represented the buyer and the target or seller in each M&A transaction. In this
subsection we summarize some of that information with an emphasis on whether
specific law firms tend to draft more often than others. Table 5 shows the top
twenty law firms by total appearances in our final sample (i.e., the law firms that
represented either the buyer or the seller in these transactions). It comes as no
surprise that Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz are the top two firms by appearances. Both of these firms are
known as powerhouses in the public M&A market.1 0 3 The table also shows that
the law firm market is quite top-heavy, with a small number of firms doing the
lion's share of M&A advisory work. 10 The firm that is ranked tenth advised on
fewer than half the number of transactions as did each of the top two firms, and
the firm that is ranked twentieth on the list advised on fewer than one seventh of
the transactions as the top firm did.
However, the table does not suggest any immediate association between a
law firm's M&A experience and the likelihood that it will provide the first draft.
Skadden and Wachtell supply the first draft in just over half the deals in which
they are counsel. Three of the next four firms on the list provide the initial draft
in less than half of their deals. No firm on the list provides the initial draft in an
overwhelming majority of its deals.

103. See Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Mergers and Acquisitions,
https://www.skadden.com/capabilities/practices/mergers-and-acquisitions/cc/mergers-and-acquisitions
[https://perma.cc/88FU-4DXC]; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Corporate: A Preeminent Corporate
Practice, http://www.wlrk.com/Corporate [https://perma.c/R37Y-ZZUY].
104. Prior research examines the high degree of concentration in the market for M&A legal
advisory work. See, e.g., Krishnan & Masulis, supra note 40, at 190 (finding that the top ten law firms
handled nearly half of the advisory work during their sample period).
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Table 5. Number of Deals and First Drafts for Top M&A Law Firms.

1

Law Firm
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher,
Flom

2

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

3

Kirkland & Ellis

Appearances

Supplied
First Draft

122

68

55.7%

107

55

51.4%

80

31

38.8%
57.3%

Pet.

&

Rank

4

Sullivan & Cromwell

75

43

5

Latham & Watkins

73

31

42.5%

6

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett

73

22

30.1%

7

Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati

51

26

51.0%

8

Weil, Gotshal & Manges

50

25

50.0%

9

Cravath, Swain & Moore

49

30

61.2%

10

Jones Day

49

26

53.1%

11

Davis Polk & Wardwell

47

26

55.3%

12

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher

44

21

47.7%

13

Vinson & Elkins

34

23

67.6%

14

Sidley Austin

33

15

45.5%

50.0%

15

Shearman & Sterling

32

16

16

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton

28

7

25.0%

17

Ropes & Gray

22

7

31.8%

18

Debevoise & Plimpton

20

7

35.0%

19

Willkie Farr & Gallagher

18

9

50.0%

56.2%
9
16
Goodwin Procter
Appendix B provides additional descriptive tables that suggest conditions
under which law firms tend to provide the first draft. Overall, we do not observe,
all else equal, that more experienced law firms are more likely to provide the
first draft of the merger agreement.
20

IV.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

In Part IV, we conduct a more complex analysis of the associations between
the agreement drafter and deal terms. We begin this analysis in Subpart A by
focusing on non-auction deals. We do so because we have a sufficiently large
sample with sufficient variation in drafter type to create a balanced, matched
sample. We then use this sample to perform regressions on specific deal terms.
In Subpart B, we conduct a similar analysis of auction deals, although we exclude
financial buyers from this analysis because there is virtually no variation with
respect to the drafting party for such deals.
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Matched Sample Analysis ofNon-Auctions.

For non-auctions, there is relatively substantial variation in the party that
drafts the agreement. As Table 3 shows, the seller supplies the first draft about
21 percent of the time. This variation allows us to limit the sample of non-auction
deals to (1) all the seller-drafted agreements and (2) a subset of buyer-drafted
agreements similar to the seller-drafted agreements with respect to important
observable deal characteristics (such as deal size, buyer type, target industry,
etc.).105 Limiting the sample in this way helps to reduce statistical biases that
could otherwise occur due to imbalance among such characteristics. 106
To create the matched sample, we use nearest neighbor propensity score
matching.' 0 7 This is a two-stage process. In the first stage, we calculate a
propensity score based on the variables that we use to match observations. The
propensity score is a value that reflects the probability that a particular merger
agreement will be drafted by the seller, based on observable characteristics of
the deal. In the second stage, each seller-drafted deal is matched to the buyerdrafted deals with the most similar propensity scores. In choosing how many
buyer-drafted deals to include, there is a tradeoff between increasing sample size
and ensuring that the matched sample is balanced (i.e., is similar along
observable dimensions). Our matching algorithm attempts to find two buyerdrafted agreements for every seller-drafted agreement because we are able to
maintain balance in the sample using this two-to-one ratio, but not when using a
three-to-one ratio. 1
We match using six variables that are likely to influence the choice of the
four deal terms that we consider. These variables represent (1) log deal value,1 09

105. We cannot, of course, be sure that the matched subsample is similar along unobservable
dimensions-that is, deal characteristics that may affect the non-price terms of the deal but for which
we do not have data. Examples of such unobservable characteristics could include the parties' private
information about the deal (such as the target knowing that the company is worth less than the buyer
believes) or the parties' idiosyncratic incentives or constraints with respect to the deal (such as one
party's desire to close the deal before a certain date).
106. We also perform regressions on the full, unmatched auction and non-auction samples and
find results that are highly similar to the matched auction and non-auction samples.
107. The technique was originally proposed and described in Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B.
Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 70
BIoMETRIKA 41, 48-51 (1983).
108. To help ensure covariate balance, we use a caliper of .5 standard deviations to select the
control units. The propensity score process calculates a distance score for each of the treated (sellerdrafted) and control (buyer-drafted) agreements. A caliper of .5 means that the distance score for each
selected control agreement must be within .5 standard deviations of the distance score for each treated
agreement. The algorithm randomly selects control agreements from those that are within the .5 caliper.
We choose a caliper of .5 because it ensures that we get two control agreements for every treated
agreement while still maintaining covariate balance. Because the largest covariate imbalance is for
strategic versus financial buyers, we use that variable to perform Mahalanobis-metric matching within
each caliper.
109.
See, e.g., Macias & Moeller, supra note 83, at 76 (finding that deal size influences MAC
clauses in M&A agreements); Eric Rauch & Brian Burke, The Impact of Transaction Size on Highly
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(2) whether the consideration is 100 percent stock,' 10 (3) whether the acquirer is
a financial buyer,' 1 ' (4) whether Delaware law governs the agreement, (5) deal
premium,1 12 and (6) the single-digit SIC industry code of the target firm. 1 13
Table 6 reflects the balance of the matched sample for all of these variables. The
means of each of these variables for the eighty-six seller-drafted agreements are
very close to the means of the variables for the 172 matched buyer-drafted
agreements.1 14 The third column presents the p-value for a two-tailed t-test of the
difference between the means of each group. In all cases, the difference in the
means is not statistically significant, which provides some confidence that our
sample is balanced along these observable variables and therefore appropriate to
use in statistical analysis.
Table 6. Matched Sample Balance for Non-Auctions.
Matched Sample Balance
P-Value

Buyer Drafted

Seller Drafted

All Stock

0.182

0.159

0.642

Financial

0.21

0.239

0.607

Delaware

0.881

0.83

0.280

ln(Value)

21.479

21.542

0.727

Premium

31.367

34.397

0.431

4.489

4.568

0.765

Single-Digit
SIC

NegotiatedM&A DealPoints, 71 Bus. LAW. 835 (2016) (arguing that deal size significantly influences
the final terms in M&A transactions).
110. See Hubert de La Bruslerie, Crossing Takeover Premiums andMix ofPayment: Empirical
Test of Contractual Setting in M&A Transactions, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 2106 (2013) (providing
evidence that the type of merger compensation affects deal terms).
111. See Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking FinanceSeriously: How DebtFinancingDistortsBidding
Outcomes in CorporateTakeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1975 (2008) (describing how strategic and
financial buyers value targets differently); Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, Strategic and
FinancialBidders in Takeover Auctions, 69 J. AMER. FIN. Ass'N 2513 (2014) (finding that strategic and
financial buyers tend to pursue different types of targets, resulting in different valuations); Jana P.
Fidrmuc et al., One Size Does Not FitAll: Selling Firms to Private Equity Versus Strategic Acquirers,
18 J. CORP. FIN. 828 (2012) (same).
112. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Abren, BargainingPower and Industry Dependence in Mergers, 103
J. FIN. ECON. 530 (2012) (finding that the target's scarcity-measured by the target's relative
profitability and industry concentration-influences deal terms). As explained in Part lfl.A, we use the
deal premium as a proxy for bargaining power imbalances between the acquirer and seller.
113. See, e.g., Macias & Moeller, supra note 83, at 73-74 (finding that MAC clauses in M&A
agreements differ according to the target's industry).
114. The reason there are only eighty-eight seller-drafted agreements in this sample-as opposed
to the 101 in Table 3-is that the use of the deal premium requires that we match each deal to the SDC
Platinum database. We are only able to do so for eighty-six of the observations.
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This table reports the means for the matched sample of non-auction
mergers. The matched sample includes 176 agreements drafted by the
buyer and 88 agreements drafted by the seller for a total of 264
observations. The p-value column reports the p-value from a two-sample
t-test of the seller-drafted and buyer-drafted agreements for the relevant
variable.
We next conduct regressions using this matched sample. In these
regressions, the dependent variables are the four non-price deal terms for which

we have data: the termination fee, reverse termination fee, go-shop period, and
MAC index.115 (The termination and reverse termination fees are expressed as a
percentage of deal value, and the go-shop period is expressed in days.) The
independent variables are (1) indicator variables representing seller drafting, allstock consideration, Delaware governing law, and whether the acquirer is a
financial buyer and (2) continuous variables representing log deal value and deal

premium. We also include fixed effects for the year in which the merger
agreement was signed and for the single digit SIC code of the target's industry.' 6
The regressions report robust standard errors.
The primary variable of interest is the indicator variable for whether the

agreement was drafted by the seller. All else equal, the seller in an M&A
transaction would prefer the following: (1) a smaller termination fee (given that

this fee is paid by the seller to the acquirer), (2) a larger reverse termination fee
(given that this fee is paid by the acquirer to the seller), (3) a longer go-shop
period, and (4) a more seller-favorable MAC clause-that is, a higher score on
the MAC index. This leads to the following predictions for our regressions. If
providing the first draft of the merger agreement is indeed associated with more
favorable terms for the drafting party, then we would expect the regression

coefficient on our indicator variable for seller-drafted agreements to be (1)
negative when the dependent variable is the termination fee, and (2) positive
when the dependent variable is the reverse termination fee, the go-shop period,

or the MAC Index.
Table 7 reports the results of these regressions both with and without fixed
effects for the year and the SIC code. For the termination fee and the reverse
termination fee, the coefficient signs for the seller-drafted indicator variable are
consistent with a first-drafter advantage-i.e., they are negative for the
termination fee and positive for the reverse termination fee. However, only the

coefficient for the reverse termination fee is statistically significant at the 5

115. We selected these terms, described in Part I.B, because they are viewed as important M&A
provisions; because they can be coded uniformly (with more or less difficulty) to allow for comparison
across deals; and because they vary widely as to how complex they are and by whom they are negotiated,
which allows us to test different hypotheses that would explain the first-drafter advantage, if any.
116.
Stated differently, we control for the year and the target company's industry in the
regressions by including separate dummy variables for each year (2007-2016) covered in our sample
and for each of the nine industries of the target companies in our matched sample.
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percent level, and that effect is no longer statistically significant when we include
controls. By contrast, we observe statistically significant coefficients on the
seller-drafted indicator variable for the go-shop period and the MAC index, both
with and without year and industry fixed effects. Moreover, these coefficients
are in the seller-favorable direction that we would expect: both are positive. In
other words, when sellers provide the initial draft, those agreements tend to have
longer periods for sellers to shop the bid, and the MAC index is higher (i.e., more
seller friendly).
Although it is not the focus of our analysis, we also note that the coefficients
for the "financial buyer" indicator variable are consistent with expectations. It is
common knowledge among deal lawyers that sellers insist on higher reverse
termination fees for financial buyers, because these buyers may fail to obtain the
third-party financing necessary to consummate the merger," 7 and well-known
8
also that go-shop provisions are much more common for private equity deals."
The large and statistically significant positive coefficients on the financial buyer
indicator variable for both the reverse termination fee and go-shop period
regressions confirm this conventional wisdom.
Table 7. Matched Sample Regressions for Non-Auctions.
Term.

Rev.
Term.

Go-Shop

MAC

Term.

Fee

Seller
Drafted

All Stock

Delaware

ln(Deal

Rev.
Term.

Go-Shop

NIAC
Index

Fee

-0.134

0.618'

3.346'

0.610*

-0.165

0.617

3.623'

0.660*

(0.131)

(0.305)

(1.589)

(0.303)

(0.133)

(0.319)

(1.527)

(0.312)

-0.25

0.680'

-1.089

0.107

-0.155

0.978*

-1.507

0.328

(0.219)

(0.337)

(1.238)

(0.417)

(0.220)

(0.395)

(1.609)

(0.470)

-0.027

0.752*

1.582

0.266

0.084

0.724

2.261

0.315

(0.183)

(0.327)

(2.225)

(0.376)

(0.182)

(0.382)

(2.425)

(0.384)

-0.149"

0.156

-0.88

0.541"*

-0.122*

0.171

-0.978

0.396"

(0.048)

(0.129)

(0.556)

(0.106)

(0.055)

(0.155)

(0.668)

(0.125)

Value)

117.
(2009).

See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failureof Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 515-22

118.

PRACTICAL LAW, No-SHOPS AND THEIR EXCEPTIONS, supra note 79 ("Go-shops are

primarily found in private equity transactions because private equity buyers tend to prefer avoiding a
full-blown auction.").
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-0.943'"

1.893'"

19.538"

0.506

-0.772*"

1.885*"

19.660*"

0.59

(0.155)

(0.381)

(2.939)

(0.373)

(0.161)

(0.423)

(2.883)

(0.381)

0.003

0.004

-0.019

0.009*

0.004

0.006

-0.02

0.009

(0.003)

(0.006)

(0.030)

(0.004)

(0.003)

(0.007)

(0.027)

(0.005)

Es

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

264

264

264

264

264

264

264

264

Adjusted R2

0.116

0.095

0.346

0.104

0.168

0.07

0.395

0.125

Deal

rem
Premium

Insar

Notes:

This table reports the coefficients for OLS regressions with each of the dependent variables
listed in the columns. The table reports robust standard errors. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***p<0.001,**p<0.01,*p<0.05.

Interestingly, we find only a muted association between deal premium and
the four deal terms. As discussed above, the deal premium is our primary (albeit
imperfect) measure of the target's bargaining power. Thus, our results do not
provide clear evidence of an association between bargaining power and the nonprice terms of a merger agreement.
To summarize, we find substantial evidence that is consistent with a firstdrafter advantage for the go-shop period and MAC clause, but little or no
evidence of an association between the termination fees and the identity of the
first drafter. These results are interpreted in Part IV.C.
B. Matched Sample Analysis ofAuctions.
In this subsection, we conduct a similar matched sample analysis of the
more overtly competitive deals. Insofar as a first-drafter advantage exists, we
expect that increased competition should reduce, if not eliminate, any benefit in
deal terms that it produces. We thus expect to see less, or no, association between
the initial drafter and the non-price terms. We expect this to be particularly true
for the most easily monetizable non-price terms such as termination fees and
reverse termination fees.
Analyzing competitive deals requires us to highlight some important
distinctions in the data we used on auctions. As Table 3 suggests, it is far more
common for the seller to supply the initial agreement in a competitive setting.
This is particularly the case for the 115 auctions won by financial buyers. The
buyer produced the first draft of the agreement in only five of these deals. This
lack of variation makes it difficult to achieve a sufficiently large sample with
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balance and, for this reason, we omit financial deals from the analysis in this
subsection. There is also very little variation in the go-shop provisions in
competitive deals. As one would expect, virtually no auction deals provide for a
go-shop period, because the deal has already been subject to competitive
pressure.11 9 As a consequence, we also omit the go-shop variable from our
regressions.
As in the previous subsection, we use propensity score matching to create
a balanced sample. We use the same variables to match observations as we did
for the non-auctions (with the exception of the financial buyer variable): (1) log
deal value, (2) whether the consideration is 100 percent stock, (3) whether
Delaware is the governing law, (4) deal premium, and (5) the single-digit SIC
industry code of the target firm. We are able to maintain a balanced sample using
a ratio of approximately six seller-drafted agreements to every one buyer-drafted
agreement. Table 8 compares the means for these variables for the twenty-five
buyer-drafted agreements with those for the 154 seller-drafted agreements in the
matched auction sample.1 20
Table 8. Matched Sample Balance for Auctions.
P-Value

Buyer Drafted

Seller Drafted

All Stock

0.120

0.114

0.930

Delaware

0.720

0.808

0.368

ln(Value)

21.036

20.858

0.622

Premium

32.095

37.977

0.401

4.600

4.575

0.959

Single-Digit
SIC

This table reports the means for the matched sample of auction
mergers. The matched sample includes 25 agreements drafted by the
buyer and 154 agreements drafted by the seller for a total of 179
observations. The p-value column reports the p-value from a twosample t-test of the seller-drafted and buyer-drafted agreements for
the relevant variable.

119. Of the 204 competitive deals won by strategic bidders, only six of them provide for a goshop period. See aLo Matthew Gentry & Caleb Stroup, Entry and Competition in Takeover Auctions,
132 J. FIN. EcoN. 298 (2019) (assessing the degree of competition in auctions versus bilateral
negotiations for M&A transactions and the associated effects on deal outcomes).
120. As mentioned before, we use a caliper of .5 standard deviations to select the matches. We
specify that the matching algorithm attempts to match eight seller-drafted deals for every buyer-drafted
deal. There are not enough observations within the caliper to get eight control observations for every
treated observation, which explains why our final ratio is closer to six.
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As we observe in the non-auction setting, all of the matching variables have
average differences that are not statistically significant in two-tailed t-tests. 121 As
before, we perform separate ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions using the
relevant non-price terms--the termination fee, reverse termination fee, and MAC
clause index-as the dependent variable. Table 9 reports the results of these
regressions.
As Table 9 shows, there is a mild association between a seller supplying
the first draft of a merger agreement and a seller-favorable MAC clause, just as
we found in the non-auction context. In the MAC Index regression, the
coefficient for the seller-drafted variable is positive and statistically significant
at the 5 percent level without the controls, but is not statistically significant with
controls included. We find no statistically significant relationship between sellerdrafted agreements and either termination fees or reverse termination fees. The
termination fee and reverse termination fee results are consistent with our
expectation that an overtly competitive bidding environment is likely to
eliminate any rents that the initial drafter might try to extract through easily
monetizable terms. The MAC clause, however, provides mildly suggestive
evidence that initial drafts supplied by sellers contain MAC clauses that are more
favorable to seller interests. Though competitive, the auction process may not
eliminate all of the advantage that drafting first conveys.
Table 9. Matched Sample Regressions for Auctions.
Termination
Fee

Seller
Drafted

All Stock

Delaware

ln(Deal

Rev.
Term.
Fee

MAC
Index

Termination
Fee

Rev.
Term.
Fee

MAC
Index

-0.045

0.428

0.862*

-0.027

0.202

0.770

(0.212)

(0.531)

(0.427)

(0.194)

(0.529)

(0.451)

0.41

-0.904*

-1.218"

0.306

-0.323

-0.904

(0.307)

(0.367)

(0.402)

(0.302)

(0.405)

(0.483)

-0.214

0.241

0.085

-0.186

0.27

0.324

(0.169)

(0.453)

(0.372)

(0.169)

(0.449)

(0.354)

-0.190"*

0.077

0.347"

-0.183"

0.09

0.250*

(0.052)

(0.117)

(0.106)

(0.058)

(0.141)

(0.107)

Value)

121. When we limit the match ratio to seven seller-drafted deals for every one buyer-drafted deal,
we obtain highly similar results in the regressions. Naturally, we obtain a tighter match on the five
relevant covariates when we implement this restriction.
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-0.006

-0.011

-0.004

-0.006

-0.01

-0.003

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.005)

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

192

192

192

192

192

192

0.109

0.011

0.091

0.152

0.026

0.191

Premium

Year and
Industry
FEs
Observations
2

Adjusted R

Notes:
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This table reports the coefficients for OLS regressions with each of the
variables listed in the columns. The table reports robust
dependent
standard errors. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***p<0.00l,**p<0.00l,*p<0.05.
C.

InterpretationofResults

Table 7 (matched sample regressions for non-auctions) provides evidence
that is consistent with a first-drafter advantage for MAC clauses and go-shop
periods, but not for termination fees and reverse termination fees. Table 9

(matched sample regressions for competitive auctions) confirms these results for
termination fees and reverse termination fees, but does not clearly resolve

whether the first-drafter advantage for the MAC clause persists in a highly
competitive sale process.
What might explain the difference in results among the four terms? By
design, we selected these terms in order to test both "business" and "legal" deal
terms for a first-drafter advantage. Practitioners and clients tend to refer to terms

with clear, easily quantifiable economic payoffs as "business" (or "economic")
terms; these are terms that tend to be negotiated by the parties themselves, rather
than their lawyers.1 22 "Legal" terms, by contrast, are those that are primarily

negotiated by counsel, generally because they are complex or require specialized
23
expertise to interpret and are difficult to translate into an economic payoff.1
The two termination fees qualify as "business" terms: they are easily and

immediately monetizable. As such, they are highly salient to the parties
themselves and are likely to serve as a focal point in negotiations.'

24

By contrast,

the go-shop and MAC clause are better described as "legal" terms, because they
are more complex and harder to monetize, and because they tend to be negotiated
primarily or exclusively by counsel. Our results might therefore suggest that the
first-drafter advantage is tied to the difficulty of monetizing terms: the less

15, 2010),
122. Darren Dahl, How to Redline a Contract, INC. (Sept.
https://www.inc.com/guides/2010/09/how-to-red-line-a-contract.html [https://perma.cc/2DRA-4HF5].
12 3. Id.
124. See Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Salience Theory of Choice Under
Risk, 127 Q.J. EcoN. 1243 (2012) (explaining that individuals overweigh the salience, or distinct relative
amount, of lottery payoffs in making choices under risk).
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monetizable the term, the more likely it is that drafting first leads to a favorable
outcome for the drafter.1 25
This relationship in turn allows us to draw tentative inferences about the
various theories that could potentially explain a first-drafter advantage. As
discussed earlier these theories included: (1) bargaining power; (2) transaction
costs and other frictions generated by the negotiation process; (3) anchoring and
framing; (4) lawyer experience; and (5) lawyer agency costs.
Our results serve most clearly to rule out the anchoring (or framing)
hypothesis. If a party's first draft of the merger agreement had an anchoring
effect on its counterparty, we would expect it to impact numerical non-price
terms (such as the termination fees) at least as much as it would the nonnumerical ones (such as the MAC clause). Instead, our results indicate there was
no statistically significant association between the first drafter and the
termination or reverse termination fees.
The regression results also do not clearly support bargaining power as an
explanation for the first-drafter advantage. We find only a limited association
between bargaining power-as proxied by the deal premium-and more
favorable deal terms. It could still be the case that bargaining power leads to
better terms, however, if bargaining power drives the selection of the first drafter.
In other words, if the party that drafts first is determined primarily by bargaining
power, then the first-drafter advantage might simply be a reflection of superior
bargaining power. Yet in that case, we would expect to observe a first-drafter
advantage with respect to all four of the merger agreement terms that we
consider, rather than just the go-shop period and the MAC clause.1 26
Nor does it appear that superior law firm experience explains the firstdrafter advantage. In Part III.D and Appendix B, we examine whether the most
experienced law firms for M&A transactions are more likely to provide the first
draft in a merger transaction, and do not find this to be the case. Further, in
unreported tests, we developed various measures of law firm experience with
M&A deals, divided into sell-side and buy-side advisory work. We did not find
any association between these measures and more favorable deal terms.
This leaves the negotiation-cost and lawyer agency-cost hypotheses as the
most plausible explanations. Merger agreement negotiations can be lengthy and
costly, given their complexity, yet the parties have strong incentives to conclude

125. An alternative explanation for why the termination fee and reverse termination fee do not
appear to vary depending on the first drafter would be that the parties generally negotiate and agree to
such terms in a term sheet before the first draft of the merger agreement is produced. If that were the
case, then our results potentially understate the size and scope of the first-drafter effect by including
transactions where these terms are pre-determined. This alternative explanation is discussed in Part V.A.
126. In unreported regressions, we include the interaction between the deal premium and the
seller-drafted indicator as an additional independent variable. The coefficients on this variable are not
statistically significant, which again fails to support the bargaining power hypothesis.
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them rapidly. 127 If the costs of negotiating each and every term in the merger
agreement are too high in terms of delay, then the first draft is akin to a take-itor-leave-it offer to the other party, at least with respect to whatever subset of
terms the parties choose not to negotiate efficiently. Under the circumstances,
the non-drafting party might choose to negotiate hard only on terms that are
easily monetized, and to defer at least to some extent to the initial draft on most
other terms. This would lead precisely to the pattern that we observe in the
regressions: a first-drafter advantage for non-monetizable terms, like the go-shop
and MAC clause, but not for easily monetized terms, like the termination and
reverse termination fees.
A non-drafting party's decision to focus on easily monetizable terms
arguably serves two purposes. First, it may in fact maximize that party's tradeoff
between obtaining the most favorable terms and concluding the transaction as
quickly as possible. Second, it can serve as a mechanism for reducing lawyer
agency costs. By focusing only on "business" terms, the principal may be trying
to limit the amount of time the lawyers spend negotiating the "legal" terms. On
the other hand, because the principal lacks expertise with respect to such terms,
it cannot know whether prioritizing the "business" terms is, in fact, the rational
choice. Our results do not resolve whether or not principals behave rationally by
focusing on easily monetizable terms.
The stronger results that we find in non-auction deals may be a product of
this less competitive setting. In non-auctions, the buyer and seller are stuck with
one another, at least to some degree. This bilateral monopoly may make it easier
for initial drafters to extract some advantage because they know that other buyers
(or sellers) are not waiting in the wings. 128 The standard non-auction M&A
drafting environment, where the principals agree on monetizable terms and
delegate drafting to the lawyers on a tight timetable, may make it especially easy
for initial drafters to take some advantage through non-monetizable terms.
Gaining an edge in agreement terms may be more difficult in the auction
environment, where sellers will typically provide a deal package that includes a
draft agreement. If the seller uses an efficient MAC clause in the deal package,
a potential buyer who includes a more buyer-friendly MAC clause in a buyerdrafted agreement is unlikely to compare favorably to other bidders. And, if

127. From the acquirer's perspective, protracted negotiations increase the risk that another bidder
will materialize and offer a higher price for the target. From the seller's perspective, lengthy negotiations
result in leaks to the public and impose real costs on the target's business by tying up management's
time and attention. For both parties, the longer negotiations last, the more likely the deal will fall through
for any reason, in which case each party will have to incur, once again, the substantial costs of reaching
a deal with another party.
128. Legal scholars and economists have long emphasized that transaction costs can make
bargaining difficult when parties are in a bilateral monopoly and do not have access to the same
information. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 251 (6th. ed. 2003); Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON.
233, 241-42 (1979).
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sellers include an overly seller-friendly MAC clause in a deal package, a bidder
could supply a draft agreement with a more efficient term along with a higher
overall price. While we cannot confirm these dynamics, they would be consistent
with our finding of a more pronounced first-drafter advantage in non-auctions.
These findings partially support and partially undermine the conventional
law and economics wisdom positing that parties will reach agreement on the
most efficient terms and exercise bargaining power only through price. Evidence
of even a limited first-drafter advantage calls into question the prediction that
voluntary agreements result in efficient terms. This is particularly notable in our
chosen setting, public company M&A, where the parties are highly sophisticated
and well informed. On the other hand, we find only very mild evidence that
drafting first provides an advantage for the terms that are most economically
significant, at least in the parties' estimation. Therefore, the precise value of this
first-drafter advantage remains an open question.
V.
POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

This Part addresses various potential concerns with the results presented in
Part IV and their interpretation.
A.

Choice ofNon-Price Terms

First, we identify possible critiques of our approach to studying the nonprice terms of M&A agreements. We will briefly discuss the difficulty of
identifying the determinants of non-price terms, the ways in which we sought to
minimize statistical errors, and challenges and responses to our method. As
discussed in Part I, standard law and economics theory states that the parties
should agree to the set of non-price terms that maximize their joint surplus. 129
Directly testing whether parties bargain efficiently in practice is infeasible,
however. For any given merger transaction, one would need to know: (1) the full
set of non-price terms to which the parties agreed; (2) the expected payoffs to
both parties from each such term; (3) the expected payoffs to both parties from
all other terms that they could have included in their bargain, but chose not to;
and (4) the expected payoffs associated with all other potential transactions that
each party could have entered into with all other potential counterparties. Aside
from the first item, each of these elements poses insurmountable difficulties. By
definition, non-price terms are not immediately translatable into an expected
payoff that is uncontestable and readily observable by all. Much of the challenge
associated with empirical testing of contract theory owes precisely to the
difficulty of observing or estimating payoffs from non-price terms. 130

129.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
130.
See, e.g., Coates IV, Explaining Variation, supra note 25, at 1312 (describing legal advice
as a "credence good" for which the value cannot be directly observed and measured).
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Instead, we take an indirect approach to this question, which avoids the
necessity of estimating expected payoffs from contract terms. We simply
consider whether one difference identified across merger deals-the particular
party chosen to provide the first draft-results in different non-price terms in the
final merger agreement. We do this by selecting specific non-price terms that
figure prominently in public company merger agreements, and by testing
whether the value of each such term tends to differ depending on whether the
acquirer or the seller was the first drafter.
Of course, we would expect that all four of the non-price terms that we
select here-the termination fee, reverse termination fee, go-shop period, and
MAC clause-would be affected by several other party, deal, and market
characteristics. In other words, we do not predict that there is a single set of nonprice terms that is efficient for all public company mergers at all times. Thus, to
account for additional factors affecting the value of these non-price terms, we
employ the technique of ordinary least-squares regression, using the non-price
term as the dependent variable, and the first drafter and other deal features as
independent variables. Examining the regression coefficient for the first-drafter
indicator variable and its standard error tells us whether there is a statistically
significant association between the first drafter and the final agreed-upon value
of the non-price term in question.
This approach gives rise to several potential critiques with respect to our
choice of non-price terms, however. We address each of these below. The first
critique is that, rather than considering the full set of non-price terms in the
merger agreement, we focus exclusively on four: the termination fee, the reverse
termination fee, the go-shop period, and the MAC clause. As a result, we do not
have a complete picture of the parties' bargain. It is well known that parties may
13 1
The buyer in
trade off one non-price term against another during negotiations.
a particular merger transaction might agree to a higher reverse termination fee,
for example, in exchange for stricter representations and warranties by the target.
The higher-than-average termination fee in that transaction can thus be explained
by a factor that we do not capture in our model. We have no reason to believe
that this buyer's tradeoff is inefficient under the circumstances. Our failure to
take into account all non-price terms could thus pose a problem for our empirical
analysis if the particular tradeoffs that parties make were related to non-price
terms that we do not include or control for in systematic ways. We cannot know
for certain whether these unobservable variables have these relationships with
the observable ones, and for that reason we are cautious in drawing inferences
from the relationships that we observe.
Second, one might object that all four of the terms that we consider are
related to one another, in that they all deal with unilateral termination of the

131. See Choi & Triantis, The Effect ofBargaining Power on Contract Design, supra note 7, at
1690-96 (describing the process of "logrolling" terms in corporate transactions).
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merger agreement by one of the parties. It is possible that parties trade these
terms against each other and, to the extent we cannot account or control for these
effects, this would be another reason to interpret the results with caution. That
said, the negotiations of these four terms may be less closely linked than their
subject matter would suggest. If, as we suspect, the principals take the lead in
negotiating some of the more monetizable terms, before they delegate to their
lawyers the task of negotiating the non-monetizable terms, then the two types of
negotiation may take place relatively independently of one another.
Third, our choice of non-price terms may lead us to understate the size and
scope of any first-drafter effect. All four of the terms studied here are widely
known and considered material to a merger transaction. Some of these terms may
therefore be negotiated and agreed to by the parties in advance of the first draft
of the merger agreement. In many non-auction deals, for example, the
termination fee and reverse termination fee may already have been agreed to in
a letter of intent or a term sheet before either party began drafting the merger
agreement. If so, we would not expect to see, for these fees, a difference
dependent on which party provided the first draft-and this is entirely consistent
with our findings. Thus, the fact that the relevant regression coefficients for the
termination fee and reverse termination fee in Table 7 are not statistically
significant could reflect either (1) that there is no first-drafter advantage for such
terms or (2) that we cannot test for such an advantage because these terms were
agreed to before the merger agreement was drafted.
However, our methodology alleviates the concern regarding pre-agreed
terms, because we perform the same regressions on our sample of auction deals
as on our sample of non-auction deals.1 32 In auction deals, the terms are
negotiated solely through the merger agreement, rather than through term sheets.
As discussed in Part IV, our results for auction deals and non-auctions deals are
consistent with respect to these two fees. Thus, we can conclude with more
confidence that there is no first-drafter advantage for termination fees and
reverse termination fees in merger agreements.
Finally, one might question whether the termination fee and the reverse
termination fee are truly non-price terms, as we posit. Facially, they appear to be
mere price terms, because they are generally expressed in dollars in the merger
agreement. The claim would be that these two fees simply reveal how the parties
choose to split the surplus from the deal (as a price term would), rather than
actually creatingsurplus for one or both parties (as a non-price term would). This
view is mistaken, however, because these fees do not represent a simple payment
from one party to the other as compensation for the transaction.1 33 Rather, these
fees play one or more roles in the transaction that can generate value for the
parties.
132. See supra Part IV.B.
133. For the principal sources in the literature on the value potentially created by termination and
reverse termination fees, see supra note 71.
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Take the reverse termination fee, for example. By agreeing to pay a reverse
break-up fee in the event that it fails to consummate the merger, the acquirer
signals to the target both that it is committed to the transaction and that it is
confident that it will have the funds necessary to complete the acquisition on the
closing date. 134 This is valuable information to the target. In addition, the reverse
termination fee shifts those specific risks of non-consummation to the buyer,
1 35
Thus, the reverse termination fee can
which is likely the efficient outcome.
enhance the value of the transaction and make it more likely that the parties will
agree to transact in the first place. The same is true of the termination fee; it
serves both signaling and risk-allocation functions that can increase the parties'
surplus from the deal.13 6 The two types of termination fees are therefore best
characterized as non-price terms.
B.

Importance of MAC Drafting

As discussed in Part IV, we consistently find that the party that prepares the
first draft of the merger agreement tends to obtain a more favorable MAC clause
in the final agreement, as measured by our MAC index. MAC clauses tend to be
divided into two parts: (1) a brief statement of what qualifies as a "material
adverse change" or "material adverse event," which would trigger the buyer's
termination right under the merger agreement, and (2) a long series of exclusions
(or "carve-outs") from this definition. Because unique language in MAC clauses
is exceedingly rare, MAC definitions may be broken up into their component
sub-clauses and compared against one another. As described in Appendix A, our
principal measure of how favorable a given MAC clause is to a party is based on
which, and how many, MAC sub-clauses the parties have chosen to include in
their MAC definition.
This raises an important question with regard to the MAC results: does it
actually matter to the parties how the MAC clause is drafted, so long as they
have a MAC clause in the agreement? More precisely, are different formulations
of the MAC clause actually associated with different expected payoffs? One can
argue plausibly that different MAC formulations should materially change the
parties' expected payoffs, or instead that they should matter little, if at all. On
balance, we believe that how the MAC clause is drafted does affect the parties'
economics (for the reasons discussed below), though we do not purport to resolve
the debate definitively.
The answer to this question does affect how one assesses the lawyers' role
in creating the drafting differences that we identify, however. If MAC drafting
does indeed matter to the parties' bottom line, then our result that the drafting
party obtains a more favorable MAC clause might suggest that (1) the drafting
See Afsharipour, supra note 72, at 1207.
134.
135. See id at 1200.
136. See Bates & Lenunon, supra note 71, at 471-72 (2003) (finding evidence that target
shareholder value is increased in deals where the target agrees to pay a termination fee).
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counsel is behaving as a faithful agent to their client in seeking a favorable MAC
clause, but also that (2) the non-drafting counsel engenders agency costs in not
bargaining sufficiently hard over the MAC clause, perhaps because clients
themselves do not pay sufficient heed to the term. If instead different MAC
clauses do not materially change the economics of the deal, the agency cost story
is reversed.137 The drafting law firm may be devoting too much time to drafting
provisions with no measurable payoff out of excessive risk aversion or a desire
to maximize billable hours. By contrast, the non-drafting law firm correctly
chooses not to push back on the MAC formulation included in the first draft,
recognizing that there is no material benefit to doing so. The subsections below
summarize the arguments for the competing views on the importance of MAC
drafting.
1.

The ParadoxicalMAC Clause.

Virtually every public company merger agreement includes a MAC
clause. 138 In our starting dataset of 1,438 merger agreements from the Practical
Law database, only three did not include a MAC. Because the occurrence of a
MAC allows the acquirer to abandon the deal between signing and closing
without paying any compensation to the seller, the clause can be enormously
significant to the economics of the deal. It has been referred to as "the most
important contract term of our time,"1 39 having been invoked repeatedly in
systemically important mergers during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

140

And

141

yet, the instances in which a court finds that a MAC
has occurred are
vanishingly rare. In the Delaware Court of Chancery, which handles much of the
highest-profile litigation involving public company mergers, no mergeragreement case had ever resulted in a finding of a MAC until 2018.142

137. See Coates IV, Explaining Variation, supra note 25, at 1309-11 (describing the agency costs
that arise in the relationship between clients and their law firms).
138. David A. Katz & Theodore N. Mirvis, Takeover Law and Practice, TUL. UNIV. L. SCH.
29TH
ANN.
CORP.
L.
INSTIT.
110
(Mar.
30-31,
2017),
http://www.law.tulane.edu/tlsLifeAfterLS/files/40/I.%20%26G.`%20%2Takeover%/2Law/`2O%20
Practice%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9CT-UFCT].
139. See Andrew A. Schwartz, A "Standard Clause Analysis" of the Frustration Doctrine and
the Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 789 (2010).
140. See id. at 835-38.
141. To note, we use the acronym "MAC" in two senses. Throughout the article, MAC largely
refers to the clause in the merger agreement itself. However, we also use it (as here) to indicate whether
a court found that a MAC clause was triggered (i.e., found that both a "material adverse change
occurred" and that none of the MAC clauses' many exceptions applied).
142. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 2008). The
first and only Delaware case to have resulted in a MAC finding, Akorn, Inc., v. Fresenius Kabi AG, et
al., C.A. No. 2018-0300JTL (Del. Ch. Oct 1, 2018), is discussed infra notes 165-168 and accompanying

text.
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Despite the courts' reluctance to enforce MACs, the clause has prompted
143
Further, disputes over
copious litigation, given the high stakes involved.
public company deals
of
repricings
MACs have occasionally resulted in major
in favor of the acquirer.1" Thus, even though courts routinely side with sellers
in MAC disputes, this has not prevented the pursuit of settlements in such
1 45
Recent empirical
disputes, including in some of the very largest mergers.
to deal
significant
highly
research concludes that the MAC clause remains
outcomes. 146
What explains this seeming paradox? Notwithstanding the difficulty buyers
face in proving the occurrence of a MAC, sellers have little incentive to pursue
litigation. First, time may well be of the essence for the target, if it did indeed
experience a serious adverse event or unexpected poor performance. If so,
agreeing to a lower deal price to avoid litigation may be the target's only
alternative to bankruptcy. In addition, litigation over a potential MAC tends to
1 47
Finally, if the
bring unwelcome publicity to the target's poor performance.
seller hopes to force the acquirer to proceed with the merger without any
alteration of the merger agreement terms, it faces the hurdle of Delaware's high
standard for injunctive relief. 148
To be sure, acquirers themselves often have little incentive to litigate.
Arguing that a MAC has occurred places the buyer in an uncomfortable position
if it is compelled to consummate the transaction in the end. For one, customers,
suppliers, and financing sources will be wary of contracting with the target, and
further, the buyer's relationship with target management and employees may be
strained. Also, certain buyers, particularly private equity firms, may want to
149
minimize any potential reputational harm from backing out of a transaction.
Additionally, given the difficulty of proving the occurrence of a MAC, buyers
may not want to risk the costs of losing. In Hexion Specialty Chemicals v.
Huntsman Corp.,15 0 a private-equity-sponsored acquirer sought to abandon its
$10.6 billion merger with Huntsman Corporation, claiming that the latter had
experienced a MAC. After the Delaware Court of Chancery found that no such
Steven D. Solomon, The MAC Is Back but Does It Kill a Deal?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
143.
(Aug. 23, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/the-big-mac-is-back-but-does-it-kill-adeal/? r=O [https://perma.cc/PY9W-UABD].
144. See infra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
146. See Denis & Macias, supranote 83; Macias & Moeller, supra note 83 (providing evidence
that MAC provisions do have a material impact on M&A terms and outcomes).
147. See Solomon, supra note 143.
148. Under Delaware law, specific performance can be obtained only upon a showing of clear
and convincing evidence. See Katz & Mirvis, supra note 138, at 111. While the Delaware Court of
Chancery in IBP ordered specific performance, it was applying New York law, which requires only that
the party seeking specific performance establish its entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence.
149. Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, Making Adverse Effects Material Again (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2016/12/making-adverse-effects-materialagain [https://perma.cc/F26F-9AUA].
150. 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008).
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change had occurred, the acquirer settled the litigation by paying not only the
$325 million reverse break-up fee, but also an additional $425 million.' 5 1
Given these disincentives to litigation, events adversely impacting the
target company may affect the deal even if the matter is not litigated. 152 First, the
possibility of a MAC may lead the parties to renegotiate the deal price. After
Yahoo suffered "the largest known security breach of one company's computer
network" in 2016, Yahoo and Verizon amended their merger agreement. 153 By
agreeing to exempt the 2016 breaches from the MAC definition, Verizon
obtained a $350 million discount from the purchase price (roughly 8 percent of
the $4.48 billion total deal value). 154 Other prominent examples of MAC-driven
repricings include Bank of America's use of the MAC clause in its $50 billion
acquisition of Merrill Lynch to receive more bailout funds during the financial
crisis, and J.C. Flowers & Co.'s use of the clause to persuade Sallie Mae to drop
its claim for a termination fee in exchange for a refinancing of its debt."ss
Second, a potential MAC may simply cause a deal to collapse. These
terminated deals occasionally lead to entirely new arrangements. When a MAC
clause disrupted KKR's $8 billion acquisition of Harman International Industries
in 2007, for example, the parties renegotiated a new deal under which KKR
would invest $400 million in convertible notes.' 56 Some deals are simply
abandoned after price renegotiation efforts fail. A $4.9 billion merger between
MGIC Investment Corp. and Radian Group Inc. was abandoned by mutual
agreement following claims that Radian had experienced a MAC. 157
We can therefore conclude that the presence of a MAC clause in a merger
agreement is economically significant for the parties. Yet this alone does not tell

151. Lisa R. Stark, Revisiting MAE/MAC Clauses in M&A after Cooper Tire, Huntsman, and
Osram,
Bus.
L.
TODAY
(Feb.
2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/02/delawareinsider.html
[https://perma.cc/V8CM-BG6E].
152. See, e.g., Natalie M. Jersak, Can You Buy Me Now?: The Erratic Closing of the VerizonYahoo Merger, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 544, 546-50 (discussing the adverse impact of Yahoo's
cyber data breaches on the Verizon merger) (2017).
153. Vindu Goel & Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says I Billion User Accounts Were Hacked, N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
14,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/technology/yahoo-hack.html
[https://perma.cc/6BCA-F2R4].
154. Scott Moritz, Verizon Reaches Deal for Lowered Yahoo PriceAfter Hacks, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-21/verizon-said-to-reach-deal-forlowered-yahoo-price-after-hacks [https://perma.cc/UZ4R-SNNX].
155. Ashton et al., Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, MAC Clauses in the UK and US.: Much Ado
About
Nothing?,
13:4
PRIVATE
EQUrIY
REPORT
(Fall
2013),
https://privateequityreport.debevoise.com/the-private-equity-report-winter-2014-vol-14-number-1/theprivate-equity-report-fall-2013-vol-13-number-4 [https://perma.cc/LX8L-VDGF].
156. Peter Lattman, When Hannan Met Kravis, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2011),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/13/when-harman-met-kravis/ [https://perma.cc/LNK8-GL4B].
157.
Lingling Wei, MGIC, Radian Untie the Merger Knot, WALL ST. J. (Sept 6, 2007),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 118899136624017977 [https://perma.cc/5AMB-STRB] (citing losses
from investing in subprime mortgages as the material adverse change).
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us whether different formulations of the MAC clause are associated with
different expected payoffs for the parties, a topic addressed in the next section.
2.

Uses and Interpretation.

The MAC clause is perplexing in that, despite its long history in corporate
transactions, there remains considerable disagreement as to how it should be
interpreted.158 The fundamental term in the MAC defimition-"material adverse
change" (or "material adverse effect")-is itself virtually never defined. In
deciding In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,159 the Delaware Court of
Chancery stated that MACs are "unknown events that substantially threaten the
overall earnings potential of the target in a durationally-significant manner." 1 60
Similarly, in Hexion, the court clarified that the adverse event must be
"consequential to the company's long-term earnings power over a commercially
reasonable period, which one would expect to be measured in years rather than
months."l 6 1 In neither case did the court point to any specific contract language
to that effect.
Recently, in The Mrs. Fields Brand, Inc. v. Interbake Foods LLC, the
Delaware Court of Chancery went even further in abstracting from the language
of the merger agreement itself. The court ruled that the MAC elements of
"knowledge, magnitude, and duration" identified in IBP would be implied in any
broadly written MAC clause that did not explicitly include these requirements. 62
If the courts tend to interpret all MAC clauses similarly and pay little heed to the
precise language used, this might suggest that specific formulations of the MAC
63
clause matter relatively little.1
Yet there is also substantial evidence to the contrary-that is, that (1) party
behavior suggests economic importance in different formulations of the MAC
clause, and that (2) courts do respond to variations in the particular language of
the agreement. First, the manner in which MAC clauses are drafted has changed
significantly over time, which would be puzzling if the precise wording were
economically irrelevant. Indeed, since IBP and Hexion, the set of seller-friendly
carve-outs to the MAC definition has expanded significantly, reflecting a
perceived expansion of sellers' bargaining power over acquirers in public

158. See Andrew A. Schwartz, A "StandardClause Analysis" of the FrustrationDoctrine and
the MaterialAdverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 789 (2010) (stating with regards to the
MAC clause that "no one knows what it means").
159. 789 A.2d 14,68 (Del. Ch. 2001).
160. Id.
161. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 2008).
162. Mrs. Fields Brand, Inc. v. Interbake Foods LLC, No. 12201-CB, at *22 (Del. Ch. June 26,
2017).
163. For example, even if the parties use forward-looking language in their MAC definition, a
MAC may not be found if it is considered a low-probability event. See Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp.,
No. 20502,2005 WL 1039027, 92 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).
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company M&A, which suggests that sellers do indeed value these MAC
exclusions. 164
Second, courts have, on occasion, decided MAC cases on the basis of a
specific carve-out. This reinforces the view that the carve-outs and the drafting
process of MAC provisions are important. The first and only case in which the
Delaware Court of Chancery found the target to have suffered a MAC was
Akorn, Inc., v. FreseniusKabi AG 16'-a 2018 case involving a $4.75 billion
transaction. The court walked painstakingly through various exceptions in the
MAC definition and explained why each did not apply. 166 Further, in finding that
the target had experienced a MAC, the court suggested that the outcome might
have been different had the parties included in the MAC clause an exception for
events arising from facts already disclosed to the buyer or in public filings-a
specific carve-out already known to the market and used in a number of
comparable transactions.' 67 Finally, the court expressly rejected the notion that
IBP imposed a uniform interpretation of all MAC clauses "regardless of what
the parties specifically bargained for in the contract."l 68
To conclude, while its impact on deal outcomes suggests that the MAC
clause itself is economically significant, it is less certain whether different MAC
formulations result in different expected payoffs for the parties. We tentatively
conclude that they do, based on recent Delaware precedent. Thus, our results are
consistent with the view that taking the lead in drafting may improve a firm's
expected payoff from an M&A transaction to some degree, by providing an
advantage with respect to terms that are relatively difficult to monetize, such as
the MAC clause and the go-shop provision.

&

164. Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, supra note 149. More generally, MAC clauses have become
longer and more detailed over the years. Ironically, theory suggests that there may be efficiencies
generated by vague MAC provisions; for example, such provisions can conceal potential obstacles to
the deal, saving transaction costs on the front end and providing incentives for bargaining. See Choi
Triantis, The Effect ofBargainingPower on ContractDesign, supra note 7.
165. No. 2018-0300JTL, 2018 WL 4719347 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018). Akom, the target company
in the disputed merger transaction, was a generic pharmaceuticals company. Id. at 11. After the merger
agreement was signed, the acquirer, Fresenius, received an anonymous letter from a whistleblower
regarding Akom's activities. Id at 3. After conducting an investigation, Fresenius uncovered "serious
and pervasive" regulatory violations and compliance failures at Akom and eventually brought litigation
seeking to terminate the merger agreement on the grounds that Akom had experienced a MAC. Id.
Siding with Fresenius on this issue, the court found, among other things, that Akorn's EBITDA
(eamings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) had declined 86 percent since the merger
agreement was signed, and that Akom had materially breached its regulatory representations. Id. at 5,
135. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Akorn opinion in a three-page order. Akorn v. Fresenius
KabiAG, 198 A.3d 724,2018 WL 6427137 (Del. Dec. 7,2018).
166.
See Akorn, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 at 142-49.
167.
See id. at 61.
168.
See id. In another case, Genesco Inc. v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 07-2137-ll(Il), 2007 WL
4698244, *33 (Tenn. Ch. Dec. 27. 2007), the court likewise weighed the specific drafting of the MAC
carve-outs. The court found that the target had indeed experienced a "material adverse effect," but that
the MAC clause was not triggered due to the inclusion ofa carve-out for adverse effects that do not have
a disproportionate effect on the target within its industry. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Deal lawyers have longstanding beliefs about who supplies the initial draft
agreement and whether supplying that draft conveys an advantage. In this
Article, we develop novel datasets on the sales process for public company M&A
(auction or non-auction), and on which side provided the first draft of the merger
agreement (buyer or seller). We show that the conventional wisdom that buyers
generally provide the initial draft is incorrect: drafting responsibility is divided
equally among buyers and sellers. The division of labor is primarily determined
by the target's sale process. Sellers almost always draft when the target is sold
in an auction, whereas buyers tend to draft in bilateral negotiations.
As for the possibility of a drafting advantage, we find that, to the extent
such an advantage exists, it appears to be a subtle one. Terms that are easy to
monetize, such as termination fees and reverse termination fees, show little or no
evidence of a favorable association with the initial drafter. However, terms that
are harder to boil down to a dollar figure, such as MAC clauses and go-shop
periods, tilt somewhat in favor of drafters.
To explain this limited first-drafter advantage, we hypothesize that the
negotiation process itself alters the incentives of the parties and their lawyers. As
a result, terms that are hard to monetize are negotiated less efficiently. Because
lengthy negotiations are costly (primarily in terms of delay), the non-drafting
party must choose which terms to focus on in negotiations. Our results are
consistent with principals having strong beliefs about monetizable terms, but less
concern for "legal" terms that are more difficult to value. If the target's lawyers
agree to a high termination fee, for example, they may get immediate negative
feedback from their client. But if those lawyers concede to a MAC clause that
favors the buyer, there may be little or no feedback. This dynamic is consistent
with lawyers using their limited negotiating capital to push back on draft terms
that are most salient to their clients.
What are the implications for M&A deals going forward? While we are
reluctant to make predictions or prescriptions based on these results, two
conclusions follow for researchers and practitioners.
First, there is considerably more work to be done in estimating the payoffs
from transaction terms. In particular, our results suggest that terms that are harder
to monetize are associated with greater contracting frictions. More broadly, there
remains a disconnect between lawyers and their clients as to the value of certain
terms, which future empirical studies could conceivably narrow or even resolve.
In the meantime, the current theoretical and empirical work in law and
economics should be more attuned to qualitative differences between transaction
terms that can in turn lead to differences in how they are negotiated and whether
they are set efficiently.
Second, there is some support for lawyers' belief in the importance of
drafting first in M&A. While practitioner lore on this point is likely exaggerated,
it is not entirely unfounded. Should every party therefore push to draft first? We
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would not go so far. It is conceivable that parties must give something up in
exchange for the right to draft first, though we do not observe this quid pro quo
in our empirical study. Notwithstanding the law and economics doctrine, lawyers
may have good reason to "grab the pen" in corporate transactions.
APPENDIX

A

- CONSTRUCTION OF

MAC MEASURES

Unlike the termination fee, reverse termination fee, and length of the goshop period, the definition of a "material adverse change" or "material adverse
effect" in a merger agreement is not specified numerically. Moreover, MAC
definitions are complex provisions with numerous and lengthy sub-clauses, the
precise wording of which varies from deal to deal. The goal is thus to derive one
or more measures of how favorable a given MAC clause is to the seller relative
to the acquirer, by analyzing its component parts. This Appendix describes the
methodology for our creation of three such alternative measures.
The first step is to break down each MAC clause in our sample into distinct
sub-clauses. MAC clauses consist of two parts. The "affirmative" MAC includes
the basic definition of what constitutes a "material adverse change" or "material
adverse effect" and would therefore trigger the acquirer's right to terminate the
merger agreement without penalty in the absence of an exception.' 69 The
following example is typical:
"Material Adverse Effect" means with respect to any Person, any
change, effect, circumstance, development or event that has had or
would reasonably be expected to have, individually or in the aggregate,
a material adverse effect on the financial condition, business, assets, or
results of operations of such Person and its Subsidiaries, taken as a
whole.
The second part of the MAC clause consists of the "exceptions" to the
MAC. This includes any carve-outs or qualifiers to the basic MAC definition.
These often include events thought to be beyond the seller's control (such as
changes in the overall economy or the capital markets, changes in law, and acts
of war or terrorism) or events for which the seller should not reasonably be
penalized (such as changes due to the announcement of the merger or due to
actions taken by the target as required by the merger agreement).17 0
Following Talley and O'Kane, we begin by identifying for each merger
agreement in our sample which of the separate sub-clauses of the MAC are
present in the agreement's MAC definition.171 Also following Talley and

169. Eric Talley & Drew O'Kane, The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-LearningProtocolfor
Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements, 168 J. INsTETUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.
181, 185 (2012).
170. See PRACTICAL LAW, MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE PROVISIONS: MERGERS AND
ACQUISMONS (2019), West Practical Law, 9-386-4019 (describing the broad categories of carve-outs
in MAC definitions).
171. See Talley & O'Kane, supra note 169 at 183.
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O'Kane, we rely primarily (with modifications) on the separate MAC subclauses identified and described in the most recent annual study of MAC clauses
172
in M&A agreements prepared by Nixon Peabody LLP.
Table Al lists each of the sub-clauses that we sought to identify in MAC
73
clauses in our merger agreement sample.'
Table Al. MAC Sub-Clauses.
MAC Sub-Clause
Affirmative MAC on target's ability to close the deal
Affirmative MAC for losses over a specified threshold
Affirmative MAC on target's prospects
Affirmative MAC if event would "reasonably be
expected" to have material adverse effect
Materiality tied to "disproportionate effects" on target
Exception for change in economy or business in general
Exception for change in general conditions of target's
industry
Exception for change in securities markets
Exception for change in trading price or volume of
target's stock
Exception for change in interest or exchange rates
Exception for acts of war, major hostilities, or terrorism
Exception for acts of God
Exception for change in political conditions
Exception for changes in laws or regulations
Exception for changes in applicable taxes/tax law
Exception for changes in target's relationship with any
labor organization/unions
Exception for seasonal reduction in revenues
Exception for delay or cancellation of orders for services
or products
Exception for facts that were expressly disclosed to the
bidder/public
Exception for effects of the announcement of the
transaction
Exception for expenses incurred in connection with
transaction
Exception for actions required or permitted by the
merger agreement
Exception for changes in GAAP

172.

% Deals
Including
Sub-Clause
62.6%
0.6%
0.6%
57.2%

Assigned
Score in
MAC Index
-1
-1
-1
-1

96.3%
97.5%
87.9%

1
1
1

77.0%
74.8%

1
1

41.1%
94.4%
64.1%
75.6%
94.7%
4.0%
2.8%

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1.7%
0.6%

1
1

14.0%

1

94.6%

1

4.8%

1

82.2%

1

91.7%

1

RICHARD F. LANGAN, JR. ET AL., 16TH ANNUAL MAC SURVEY, NIXON PEABODY (Dec.

https://www.nixonpeabody.com/-/media/Files/PDF-Others/mac-survey-2017-nixon2017),
18,
peabody.ashx [https://perma.cc/7C5D-MBRR]. The precise MAC sub-clauses that we coded differ
slightly from those listed in the Nixon Peabody and Talley & O'Kane studies, however, for two reasons.
First, we chose not to code a small number of clauses that are both extremely rare and prone to nonnegligible error rates in our automated searches (described below). Second, we combined certain subclauses that are virtually always included together and appear redundant.
In our MAC analysis, we excluded the three merger agreements that did not grant the seller
173.
a right to terminate the merger agreement following the occurrence of a material adverse event
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Exception for failure by the target to meet revenue or
earnings projections
Exception for actions required to be taken by law or by
target's existing contracts
Exception for litigation related to the transaction
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% Deals
Including
Sub-Clause
90.1%

Assigned
Score in
MAC Index
1

4.2%

1

50.1%
1
For each merger agreement in our sample, we coded the presence or

absence of each MAC sub-clause, using word searches (created using regular
expressions) to identify them.1 74
We then constructed three separate measures of how favorable a MAC

clause is to the seller relative to the acquirer. These included: (1) an index based
on the presence or absence of the sub-clauses identified in Table Al above; (2)
a count of the total number of sub-clauses found among the exceptions to the

MAC clause (regardless of whether the sub-clause appears in the Nixon Peabody
survey); and (3) a count of the total number of words in the exceptions to the

MAC clause. The index was constructed as follows. First, we divided all MAC
sub-clauses listed in Table Al into two groups according to whether they are
favorable to the seller or to the acquirer. We then assigned seller-favorable
clauses a value of +1 if included in the merger agreement and 0 otherwise.

Similarly, we assigned buyer-favorable clauses a value of -1 if included in the
agreement and 0 otherwise. We then summed all of these scores for each MAC
definition in our sample.1 75
The index is an imperfect measure in several ways, however. First, though

the legal or practical significance of the various MAC sub-clauses may differ
widely, we assign them equal weight. For example, the exception for changes in
the economy or business in general (included to account for the possibility of a
recession, for example) is likely to be far more valuable to the seller than the
exception for changes in GAAP. Second, the index does not give credit for MAC
sub-clauses that are unique to a particular transaction and therefore not

catalogued in the Nixon Peabody annual survey. For this reason, we also use the
total number of sub-clauses and total number of words in the exceptions to the

MAC clause as two alternative measures of how seller-favorable the MAC is.1 7 6
(All else being equal, the more exceptions to the MAC clause, the more sellerfavorable the provision should be.)

&

174. Talley and O'Kane also employed machine learning to automatically code MAC subclauses, as an alternative to the regular expressions approach, in their study of MAC clauses. Talley
O'Kane, supra note 169, at 183.
175. The approach is similar to that of Marotta-Wurgler, who creates an index for how consumerfriendly EULA contracts are. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, supranote 14, at 327.
176. Denis and Macias use a similar technique of counting the number of exclusions to the MAC
definition. Denis & Macias, supra note 83, at 827-29.
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Table A2. Measures of seller-favorable MACs.
MAC Measures

Sample
Avg.

Std. Dev.

1. Index of seller-favorable MAC (based on the presence or
absence of well-known MAC sub-clauses)
2. Total number of sub-clauses in exceptions to MAC

11.44

2.46

9.01

+

2.50

3. Total number of words in exceptions to MAC

123.77

±

53.17

Notwithstanding their differences, we find that our three measures of how
favorable the MAC clause is to the seller relative to the acquirer are highly
correlated. The results reported in Part IV rely solely on the first measure (the
MAC index).
APPENDIX

B

- LAW FIRM INVOLVEMENT IN

M&A TRANSACTIONS

(CONT.)

This Appendix provides additional detail on law firm involvement in the
M&A deals in our sample, focusing in particular on whether more experienced
law firms are more likely to provide first drafts of merger agreements.
Tables Bla and Bib list the number of times, in our sample of non-auction
deals, each law firm appears representing the buyer or the seller, respectively.
These tables suggest that experienced firms may be slightly more likely to draft
first, but this evidence is far from overwhelming. In non-auctions, the buyer
drafts in about 79 percent of the deals. For the top three firms that represent
buyers in non-auctions-Skadden, Wachtell, and Sullivan & Cromwell-that
measure is over 80 percent for all three. That is true for all of the top ten firns
on this list other than Simpson Thacher and Latham & Watkins. There is a
somewhat similar trend for law firms representing targets in non-auctions. The
overall average for target law firms providing the initial draft is about 21 percent.
The top four firms on the list all provide the initial draft at a rate higher than the
average. Three of the top-ten firms provide the initial draft at a rate lower than
21 percent, however, and two of those firms draft at a percentage rate in the
single-digits.
Table Bla. Law Firms Representing Acquirers in Non-Auctions.
Supplied
Law Firm

Rank

Appearances

First
Draft

Percentage

1

Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom

37

30

81.1%

2

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

30

26

86.7%

3

Sullivan & Cromwell

27

23

85.2%

4

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett

22

11

50.0%

5

Davis Polk & Wardwell

21

17

81.0%

6

Jones Day

20

16

80.0%

2019]

IS THERE A FIRST-DRAFTER ADVANTAGE IN M&A?

1171

7

Weil, Gotshal & Manges

19

18

94.7%

8

Latham & Watkins

16

9

56.2%

9

Cravath, Swain & Moore

15

13

86.7%

Kirkland & Ellis

15

13

86.7%

10

Table Bib. Law Firms Representing Targets in Non-Auctions.
Rank

Law Firm

Appearances

Supplied
First
Draft

Percentage

1

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

36

9

25.0%

2

Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom

33

10

30.3%

3

Latham & Watkins

23

6

26.1%

4

Sullivan & Cromwell

23

6

26.1%

5

Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati

20

1

5.0%

6

Cravath, Swain & Moore

19

7

36.8%

7

Kirkland & Ellis

16

7

43.8%

8

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett

14

2

14.3%

9

Weil, Gotshal & Manges

14

1

7.1%

10

Jones Day
12
3
25.0%
For firms representing targets in auctions, the trends are more consistent
with the overall averages. Across the entire sample of auctions, the seller
provides the first draft about 90 percent of the time and the buyer 10 percent of
the time. As Tables B2a and B2b show, some of the top firms representing
buyers in auctions-such as Kirkland & Ellis and Simpson Thacher-provide
the first draft at a rate lower than this, while others exceed this rate. For firms
representing targets in auctions, once again some of the most experienced firms
draft at a rate above the overall average while others draft at a rate below that
mark.

Table B2a. Law Firms Representing Acquirers in Auctions.
Ran k

Law Firm

Appearances

Supplied
First
Draft

Percentage

Kirkland & Ellis

40

2

5.0%

2

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
Flom

29

1

3.5%

25

3

12.0%

&

1

3
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4

Latham & Watkins

20

2

10.0%

5

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

17

2

11.8%

6

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher

12

2

16.7%

7

Sullivan & Cromwell

12

2

16.7%

8

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton

11

0

0.0%

9

Weil, Gotshal & Manges

11

0

0.0%

9

0

0.0%

10

Ropes & Gray

Table B2b. Law Firms Representing Targets in Auctions.

1

Law Firm
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
Flom

2

Appearances

Percentage

&

Ran[kC

Supplied
First
Draft

27

25

92.6%

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

24

18

75.0%

3

Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati

19

16

84.2%

4

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher

14

14

100.0%

5

Latham & Watkins

14

14

100.0%

6

Sullivan & Cromwell

13

12

92.3%

7

Cravath, Swain & Moore

12

10

83.3%

8

Jones Day

10

6

60.0%

9

Kirkland & Ellis

9

9

100.0%

Davis Polk & Wardwell

8

7

87.5%

10

